

STIMSON



JAPAN AS A
PEACE ENABLER

Views from the Next Generation

EDITED BY YUKI TATSUMI

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MARCH 2016

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Preface

I am pleased to present the latest publication from Stimson's Japan program. This volume *Japan as a Peace Enabler: Views from the Next Generation* is a collection of short, current analyses by leading and emerging policy experts from Japan. The five authors are scholars and advisors to the Japanese government, who also embody Stimson's quarter-century-long tradition of building useful and effective bridges between independent experts and government decision makers.

The topics they cover in this volume — Japan's relationship with the United Nations, the concept of "human security," US-Japan efforts to address state fragility, human resource development for peacebuilding, and Japan's contributions to peacekeeping operations — are all issues of considerable policy interest and concern in Washington and the wider UN community. I am confident that this volume will make an important contribution to the public conversation about Japan's increasingly robust diplomatic efforts in peacebuilding, as part of its proactive contribution to international peace and stability.

I am grateful to Yuki Tatsumi, who leads Stimson's work on Japan and is a facilitator of US-Japan relations on several levels, for her leadership of this project, and for her insights and analysis on these topics. Yuki is a deeply respected non-partisan voice on both sides of the Pacific. This volume contributes to her reputation as a solid and pragmatic scholar in this critical region of the globe. I am also appreciative of the support and guidance from our friends at the Embassy of Japan as well as our in-house research team, most notably Hana Rudolph.

Brian Finlay
President
The Stimson Center

Acknowledgments

First, I would like to thank the contributors to this report. Dr. Toshiya Hoshino, Colonel Michio Suda, Mr. Kazuo Tase, Mr. Kazuto Tsuruga, and Dr. Yuji Uesugi made time out of their busy schedule to travel to Washington, D.C. for workshops and public seminars. They are all well-respected for their scholarly work and therefore in high demand. I cannot thank them enough for their commitment to complete these policy briefs. I am also grateful for the collaboration, support, and encouragement of the Embassy of Japan. Without their support, this project would not have been possible.

As usual, I am very grateful for my Stimson colleagues. Brian Finlay, Stimson's new president, has been wonderfully supportive. I appreciate the participation by William Durch (Distinguished Fellow, Future of Peace Operations program) and Aditi Gorur (Director, Protecting Civilians in Conflict program) in the workshops, as they provided very helpful feedback to the contributors. I would also like to thank two Stimson alums — Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Holt and Senior Advisor for Department of State Alison Giffen — for their participation. Lita Ledesma, Hana Rudolph, and Linnea Logie all must be recognized for their role in taking on the labor-intensive details to prepare this report for publication.

Finally, my gratitude and appreciation goes to my family — Hideaki and Akiyoshi.

Yuki Tatsumi
Senior Associate, East Asia program
March 2016

Abbreviations

APRRP	African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership
ARDEC	African Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASIFU	All Source Information Fusion Unit
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSO	Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU	European Union
FAO	UN Food and Agriculture Organization
FCC	Financial Contributing Countries
FHS	Friends of Human Security
FY	Fiscal Year
GA	UN General Assembly
GHRDPD	Global Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding and Development
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
HPC	Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center
HRDAP	Human Resource Development in Asia for Peacebuilding
HRDP	Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding
HSI	Human Security Index
HSU	Human Security Unit
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IDA	International Development Association
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
IOP	International Organization of Migration
IPC	International Peace Cooperation
IPCA	International Peace Cooperation Act

IPI	International Peace Institute
IS	Islamic State
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JDR	Japan Disaster Relief
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JIIA	Japan Institute of International Affairs
JMSDF	Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
JOCV	Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers
JPO	Junior Professional Officers
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Forces
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MONUSCO	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC
MTDP	Mid-Term Defense Program
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDPG	National Defense Program Guidelines
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Secretariat
NSS	National Security Strategy
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PA	Program Associate
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
POC	Protection of Civilian
P5	Permanent 5 (Members of the UN Security Council)
QDDR	Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals

SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SML	Senior Mission Leaders
SRSG	Special Representative of the UN Secretary General
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
Tech CC	Technology Contributing Countries
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force in Golan Heights
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN International Children's Emergency Fund
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIN	UN Mission in Nepal
UNMIS	UN Mission in Sudan
UNMISSET	UN Mission of Support to East Timor
UNMISS	UN Mission in South Sudan
UNOMOZ	UN Operations in Mozambique
UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	UN Transition Authority in East Timor
UNTFHS	UN Trust Fund for Human Security
UNV	UN Volunteer
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
WW2	World War Two



Introduction

Yuki Tatsumi and Hana Rudolph

“Japan is resolved to continue to take on great responsibility, working hand-in-hand with the international community... At the time the United Nations came into being, Japan was recovering from having been reduced to ashes. Since then, Japan has never for a moment forgotten the horrors of war. Japan’s future lies in a straight extension of our history over the past 70 years. Our pledge never to wage war is something that will be handed down and fostered by the Japanese people for generations upon generations to come. Japan has been, is now, and will continue to be a force providing momentum for proactive contributions to peace.”

—PRIME MINISTER SHINZO ABE, SEPTEMBER 15, 2014¹

The evolution of Japan’s contribution to international peace through the United Nations has been remarkable. Today, Japan engages with the UN through peacekeeping operations and collective security measures, diplomatic efforts, and humanitarian assistance and relief. Japan now seeks to be an active, permanent member of the UN Security Council too, to aid in the decision-making. Seventy years after the end of World War Two and sixty years since Japan’s accession into the UN, the remarkable post-war development of Japan into a peace-loving nation could not be more evident.

“Proactive contribution to peace” is a major diplomatic initiative that Japan has actively pursued under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. In December 2013, Japan’s National Security Strategy (NSS) described Japan as a “proactive contributor to peace.”² The NSS emphasized the importance of strengthening diplomacy at the United Nations, promoting international peace cooperation, sharing universal values, responding to global development issues, realizing human security, and cooperating with human resource development efforts in developing countries. Prime Minister Abe has actively worked to realize these efforts through a number of initiatives — within the UN, in tandem with partner countries, and independently.

Perhaps most dramatically, at the 2014 Summit on Strengthening International Peace Operations, Prime Minister Abe highlighted Japan’s commitment to capacity building, including the recruitment and development of more experts to contribute to the field of peacebuilding.³ He also mentioned changes to Japan’s legal security framework as potentially opening new opportunities for Japanese engagement in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and other security measures, as Tokyo seeks to demonstrate greater flexibility for Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) deployments. The Abe government has not only identified the need for greater contributions for international peace and stability, but it has actively sought internal reforms in order to fill those needs.

Japan remains firmly committed to creating a larger role for itself within the UN, across levels and agencies. In his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2015, Prime Minister Abe called Japan a “Gap Bridger” — connecting layers of decision-making, resource-preparation, and operation.⁴ As a peace-loving nation with a rich history of active involvement in the UN, Japan is uniquely equipped in its identity, experiences, and strengths to contribute even more dynamically for world peace and prosperity. Though fierce challenges are ahead — regional concerns of militarization, declining financial resources, and a changing global order — Japan has made incredible strides towards alleviating fears, creating strategic and sustainable partnerships, and implementing domestic reforms to respond to the shifting environment.

Japan as a Peace Enabler: Views from the Next Generation offers a collection of policy briefs on the evolution of Japan’s contribution to international peace, particularly through the United Nations. Building on previous volumes, *Japan’s Foreign Policy Challenges in East Asia* and *Japan’s Global Diplomacy*, the volume expands its scope beyond bilateral, state-to-state relationships, in order to examine Japan’s efforts at peacebuilding at a multilateral level as a part of its proactive contribution to international peace and stability. Similar to its predecessors, these briefs are written by a mixed group of leading and emerging experts and scholars in the issues at hand. Each scholar was asked to write a policy brief that addresses the following five questions: (1) What are Japan’s national interests and policy goals?; (2) What contributions have Japan made to the present?; (3) What are gaps between Japan’s intentions and actions, and how can these gaps be overcome?; (4) How can Japan engage the US effectively?; and (5) What set of policy recommendations can be offered for consideration? The authors all describe Japan’s unique and important role as a contributor to international peace, as well as means by which Japan can strengthen its partnership with the US and partner nations in the UN in order to more effectively respond to growing challenges.

Dr. Toshiya Hoshino, Executive Vice President and Professor at Osaka University, provides an overview of Japan’s relationship with the United Nations. In the past seventy years, the world has dramatically changed — not least of which includes Japan’s own role in the international community as an Axis power to a leading, peace-loving UN member state. As the world increasingly faces challenges to the 1945 order, Hoshino explains how sovereign states grow weaker while non-governmental organizations seem better able to empower civilian populations. Recognizing these new challenges, Hoshino suggests how Japan’s expertise and convictions as a peace-enabling state may enable it to aid in the challenges ahead.

Kazuo Tase, a former diplomat who currently serves as Director of the Global Strategy Office for Deloitte Tohmatsu Consulting in Japan, explains the concept “human security” that the government of Japan has endeavored to have recognized by the UN as a comprehensive and effective framework for international developmental, humanitarian, and peace-building initiatives. Japan’s singular efforts towards this end — working with the UN Secretariat, establishing the

UN Trust Fund for Human Security, and consolidating support in the General Assembly — have been tremendously effective, but isolated in management. At the same time, the term “human security” has faced challenges too, for potentially being overly broad and comprehensive. Despite the challenges, Tase emphasizes the value of Japan’s endeavors for the international community.

Kazuto Tsuruga, Associate Professor at Osaka University’s Global Collaboration Center, describes Japan’s and US efforts towards addressing state fragility. Post-September 11, this issue has been at the fore of international security, and both the US and Japan share strategic interests in mitigating the risks. Explaining the factors, indicators, and concerns for state fragility, along with both countries’ efforts to relieve the pressures and causes, Tsuruga identifies ways in which Japan’s capacities and strengths can be better utilized through the scope of the alliance. Japan must be ready for the financial, personnel, and political commitment necessary to play a major role. Tsuruga suggests mechanisms in tandem with the US and UN that may allow Japan to do so effectively.

Dr. Yuji Uesugi, Professor at Waseda University’s School of International Liberal Studies in Tokyo, provides great insight into the Japanese government’s effort to develop human resources for peacekeeping, both among Japanese civilians and those of other nationalities. The Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding program is an avenue by which Japan can contribute to the international community in enhancing civilian capacity. The endeavor, with its multifaceted training programs, provides a successful example by which Japan and other countries — particularly together — can continue to strive to meet the global needs for more expertise. Uesugi’s policy recommendations encourage continued investment in human resources in close cooperation with other programs and agencies, both within the Japanese government and alongside other countries.

Finally, Colonel Michio Suda (Japan Ground Self-Defense Force), Senior Military Liaison Officer with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations, offers a new perspective on Japan’s contributions to peacekeeping operations, suggesting a double triangular partnership approach moving forward. Suda describes the growing effort by Tokyo to increase Japan Self-Defense Forces participation in peacekeeping operations, particularly by allowing greater flexibility for deployment under security legislation. Steady progress towards this effort, coupled with Japan’s unique and cooperative approach to capacity building, benefit the UN and partner states. Suda recommends strengthening peacekeeping efforts between Japan, the UN, and troop-contributing countries, and developing further means of partnership peacekeeping alongside the US and European Union with their shared advanced capabilities.

Each of these papers highlights broad themes of Japan’s role as a peace enabler. Japan has come a long way in the seventy years since the war, and it has established its role as a fervent protector of the international peace and stability maintained under the 1945 order. Recognizing new challenges that the world faces today, Tokyo has sought to increase its role and capabilities in order to further contribute to the

growing need for expertise, contributions, and decision-making. Under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan is becoming better equipped to serve as a peace enabler. The next steps Japan must take will be to work even closer with other countries — the United States, as its ally, as well as partner countries within the United Nations.

It is our hope that these policy briefs will serve as a useful point of reference when examining Japan’s role as a “proactive contributor to peace based on the principle of international cooperation.” We also hope that, by reading these briefs, readers can better appreciate Japan’s intentions, efforts, and hopes for the peace and stability of the international community.

Endnotes

1. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (speech delivered at the Sixty-Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, NY, September 15, 2014), MOFA, www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp_a/page24e_000057.html.
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4. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (speech delivered at the Seventieth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, NY, September 29, 2015), MOFA, www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp_a/page4e_000321.html.



Japan and the UN: An Overview

Toshiya Hoshino

In 2015, the United Nations (UN) celebrated the 70th anniversary of its establishment as the most universal intergovernmental organization committed to the maintenance of international peace and security in the post-World War Two (WW2) world. For Japan, this occasion means seventy years have passed since the end of the Pacific war, in which Japan, as an Axis power, fought against and was defeated by the Allied powers — then called the “United Nations,” or *Rengo-koku* (連合国) in Japanese. For the victors of WW2, a natural continuity led its key members to establish the United Nations as the world knows it today. But for Japan, this was not the case. This is the reason why the Japanese government gave a different Japanese name, *Kokusai Rengo* (国際連合; *Kokuren*), to refer to the post-war institution for peace.

The past seven decades have brought major changes in the role Japan plays within the international community. Indeed, Tokyo today is an indispensable member of the UN, not only as the second-largest financial contributor, but also as one of the most active “peace enabler countries” advancing the goals and missions detailed in the UN Charter. Moreover, Japan has become an important treaty ally to the United States in East Asia and the Pacific. These developments demonstrate the commendable transformation of Japan from former adversary of the Allied powers (i.e. UN) to leading, “peace-loving” UN member state.

Even today, however, several states that neighbor Japan have yet to fully embrace this view of Japanese political development. Despite Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s efforts to emphasize his government’s “unshakable” position and offer his own personal “feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology” in a statement delivered August 14, 2015, a day before the 70th anniversary of the end of WW2, individuals in China and South Korea have remained skeptical of Abe’s policies, labeling them examples of “post-war history revisionism” and excessive “nationalism.”²¹ Passage of landmark legislation concerning peace and security by the Japanese Diet in September 2015, for example, was portrayed as the resurgence of Japanese militarism. Meanwhile, both Moscow and Beijing conducted large-scale military parades to remind domestic and foreign audiences of their governments’ WW2 victory against the Axis powers seventy years ago.

Thus, it is clear that the world has dramatically changed since 1945. Unfortunately, the UN has failed to keep pace with the rate of change. Composition of the UN Security Council, the most powerful body in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, has remained the same for the past fifty years, despite repeated calls for reform and the growth in UN membership to include 193 nations (a far cry from the 51 founding states). The Security Council expanded the number of non-permanent members only once (in 1965), and the five permanent members — the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China — retain disproportional dominance over other UN nations.

Challenges to the “1945 Order”

The key guiding principles of the UN Charter: non-use of force for aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and peaceful settlement of disputes, among others, remain relevant in today’s international context, though this “1945 Order” now faces challenges from multiple sides. First, Russia and China are flouting their responsibilities as permanent members of the UN Security Council by attempting to unilaterally alter national borders in Crimea and both the East and South China Seas respectively, by force. Second, extremist non-state actors such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) are destabilizing the international order with terrorist attacks. The latter organization in particular, as a violent radical Sunni Muslim group that aspires to restore the old Islamic caliphate in the contemporary world, regards international borders as illegitimate artifacts of colonial domination by past imperialist powers. All this to say the current global environment clearly demands recalibration of the UN Charter.

Indeed, the challenges facing the international community are evolving within a context which the drafters of the UN Charter never imagined: a world in which sovereign independent states, considered the most basic units of international politics, are growing weaker, while benevolent non-governmental and civil society organizations attempt to empower civilian populations with varying degrees of success (not to mention the burgeoning competition they face from malevolent non-state terrorist groups). Feeding such trends are forces within the global market economy that promote economic disparities and render weaker, less affluent states and peoples more vulnerable. Add to this worsening global outlook the existence of many failed and fragile states in Asia and Africa, where some governments have lost control over parts of their territory, allowing terrorist groups and armed extremists to thrive. Finally, the advancement of personalized computers and information technology bears considerable geostrategic implications, lending both the well- and ill-intentioned the means to more easily — and perhaps more dramatically — influence governments.

Policymakers in even the most powerful nations must also contend with domestic pressures. Beijing and Moscow are prime examples. The desire to blunt or deflect public frustration with the government (as well as to galvanize patriotic or nationalist sentiment) provided a major incentive not only for Russia’s annexation of Crimea and China’s recent reclamation activities in the South China Sea, but also for the large-scale military parades held in Tiananmen Square in China and Red Square in Russia to mark the 70th anniversary of victory against the Axis powers.

The plight of people in extremely vulnerable positions, be they related to conflict, poverty, natural disasters, or human rights abuses, also remains a major challenge for the international community. The UN, as an intergovernmental political body dealing with the maintenance of international (i.e. inter-state) peace and security, suffers from fundamental structural limitations when it comes to addressing matters directly related to the advancement of human peace and security: the UN cannot intervene on behalf of civilians anywhere in the world without first securing host country approval or authorization by binding Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, though in

recent years the world has developed the notion of “responsibility to protect” as grounds for preventing and responding to genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, efforts to act upon this concept are frequently blocked by disreputable governments or permanent Security Council members with a direct stake in the case. Additionally, non-state actors like IS are not represented by any legitimate state authority in the UN, complicating the ability of member states to address the threat posed by terrorist activities. The international community must find ways to overcome these structural and political barriers.

Japan’s Approach to the UN

Japan will commemorate the 60th anniversary of its accession to the UN in December 2016, and there are a number of policy initiatives that Tokyo can take to further expand its role in and commitment to the international order, especially in light of the global challenges detailed above. Japan should review and identify the most effective ways of utilizing the UN to address issues of global relevance, and in so doing, pursue its own national interests, particularly those delineated by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s policy of “proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation.”

Prime Minister Abe introduced the National Security Strategy (NSS), the first-ever policy document of its kind in Japan, after assuming office and reviewing Japan’s contemporary foreign and security policy. The NSS, released December 2013, articulates Japan’s overarching national security policy goals, stating that Japan has “consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War Two. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.”² On its alliance with the US, the document stresses, “Japan has maintained its security, and contributed to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, by enhancing its alliance with the United States with which it shares universal values and strategic interests, as well as by deepening cooperative relationships with other countries.”³ And on its relationship with the UN, the NSS says “Japan has been cooperating with the UN and other international organizations, and has actively contributed to their activities,” through participation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and consistent engagement in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.⁴

Also identified in the NSS as areas in which Japan should focus its efforts to further contribute to international stability and prosperity include “initiatives for supporting the economic growth of developing countries and for addressing global issues based on the principle of human security,” as well as “trade and investment relations with other countries.”⁵

Japan indeed boasts a unique approach to UN policies that stands on three traditional pillars: nuclear disarmament, economic development, and humanitarian assistance. All three reflect Japan’s national experiences, specifically the devastation and loss of life caused by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the rapid

nature of its economic recovery and infrastructural repairs following WW2 and post-war natural disasters (it also bears mentioning that the very real threat posed by North Korea's nuclear and missile proliferation deepens the Japanese inclination toward nuclear disarmament). Japan has actively put its beliefs into practice, helping many developing countries achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), which has convened five times since its formation over twenty years ago, has proven itself an important policy tool for advancing African development in collaboration with the UN — and in 2016, Japan will hold TICAD in Africa for the first time. It signifies that Japan's international development efforts, though traditionally Asia-focused, have become fully globalized.

While Japan often favors a civilian approach to foreign humanitarian assistance, it became more actively involved in military-related missions — though not combat operations, which are banned by Japan's Peace Constitution — after Japan was severely criticized for making a mere “check book” contribution to the Gulf War in the early 1990s. Japan subsequently became more proactively engaged in promoting peace in Cambodia by participating in political mediation efforts designed to help reach a peace agreement, dispatching Japan Self-Defense Forces under the auspices of the UN peacekeeping framework (the mission was led by a Japanese Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN), and providing official development assistance for post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian relief purposes. Such involvement in Cambodian “state-(re)building” was followed by contributions to peacekeeping missions in places such as Timor Leste, Haiti, and South Sudan; the humanitarian and reconstruction mission in Iraq; and the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. Japan then went on to formalize its interpretation of the notion of “human security” as the protection and empowerment of people whose lives, livelihood, and dignity are under threat. Tokyo's experiences as the most-elected non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and as a founding member (and the former Chair of the Organizational Committee) of the UN Peacebuilding Commission have also steadily grown more diverse and substantive over the years.


Four Tiers of Action to Enhance Resilience of States and People

With these multitudes of threats, as states face vulnerabilities and civilians in violent situations require protection, Tokyo must consider how to enable peace in a way that assists both states and civilians in becoming more resilient to future challenges.

The following four tiers of action illustrate lessons learned and best practices in enhancing state resiliency and human peace and security.

The first tier relates to measures for restoring the physical safety and security of people in violent situations, as well as for promoting reconciliation among parties in instances of conflict through inclusive political settlements that lay the foundations for peace. While third-party mediation, transitional justice mechanisms, and the disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration (DDR) of ex-combatants

Figure 1: Four Tiers of Action to Enhance Resilience of States and Human Peace and Security



(including child soldiers) require much patience and compromise, they have important roles to play and should not be minimized or marginalized. What is more, active participation by and the empowerment of women in the society in question should be encouraged to foster greater gender equality in the future.

The second tier entails a set of measures that address poverty and social inequalities, while also creating a humanitarian space to provide emergency relief and basic human needs in a timely manner. No peace can be successfully forged without winning the hearts and minds of people who have suffered protracted periods of fear and despair. Economic rehabilitation and development are thus conducive for peace, because they provide tangible peace dividends — relief materials, jobs, and better welfare — to local populations. Furthermore, addressing social inequality directly prevents the exploitation and recruitment of local populations by radical extremist groups, and promoting community-based economic development opens an avenue for creating and consolidating democratic institutions, the prerequisites for building a peaceful society.

The third tier is composed of those efforts that promote governance reform (with the ideal being a more democratic system), human capacity building, and infrastructure development. When it comes to political reform, governments are perceived as most legitimate when backed by broadly representative structures committed to democracy, rule of law, and the protection of human rights. It is therefore the responsibility of domestic leaders and foreign partners to create open and transparent systems of governance. Here, the capacity of political and military leaders, professional civil servants (including police personnel), local civil society, and independent media should also be earnestly enhanced. With respect to human capacity, the provision of education to younger cohorts is an important investment in the next generation of leaders. Similarly, the importance of developing and rehabilitating social and physical infrastructure (e.g. life lines, roads, ports, airports, bridges, schools, and hospitals)

should not be underestimated. Such efforts will significantly improve the business environment in the country at hand, promoting global trade and investment and, in turn, facilitating further development of both state and society.

The fourth and final tier consists of steps to improve governmental resilience so that the country receiving assistance develops a degree of self-sufficiency necessary to sustain internal programs and overall economic growth without relying heavily upon outside support. Such an objective would also likely entail incorporating the country within networks of global cooperation as a valuable and responsible member of the international community, willing and able to promote peace. Assistance from others may still be necessary; in fact, there is no completely self-sufficient country in the world. But in an ideal globalized world, each country would be aware of the reality of mutual interdependence and division of labor, nurturing its comparative advantages and engaging in the trade of goods and services. The role of international organizations (like the UN) and their members is to collaborate as much as possible to remove obstacles and set rules for achieving common peace and prosperity.

With those four layers of activities, the fundamental functions of a sound state apparatus can be built while advancing the peace and security of populations on the ground. Fragility can gradually give way to resilience as a state moves from post-conflict stabilization to peace consolidation, and then on to self-sustaining peace and development.

Japan in the UN — A Peace-Enabling State

The paths outlined above are evocative of those Japan underwent over the last seventy years. Japan committed itself to be a force for peace in the post-war world, and in 1947, while rebuilding itself from the ashes of a devastating war during the US-led occupation, Japan adopted its Peace Constitution. Tokyo signed both the San Francisco Peace Treaty and a bilateral security treaty with the United States in September 1951, and when the Peace Treaty went into effect in April 1952, Tokyo finally regained its independence and applied for UN membership with strong support from the United States. Unfortunately, the heightened East-West tensions that characterized the peak of the Cold War made Japan's admission to the UN impossible, an aspiration left to languish until Tokyo normalized diplomatic relations with Moscow at the end of 1956.

Japan's membership with the UN was then part of the three fundamental principles underpinning Japanese foreign policy: fully supporting the UN, joining countries that represent Western liberal democracies, and being recognized as a major Asian country. Looking back today, it is clear that these three pillars were the antithesis of the policies that fed pre-war isolationism, militarism, and fervent nationalism in Japan (i.e. withdrawal from the League of Nations over the Manchurian issue, alliance with the Axis Powers, and domination and colonial rule over many parts of Asia, all of which ended with tragic defeat in the war).

With these hard lessons learned, Japan came to feel a deep sense of remorse and heartfelt apology, and Japan was reborn. Now, Tokyo has started the year 2016 — the commemorative year of the 60th anniversary of its accession to the UN — as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the 11th time (Japan is by far the most frequently-elected UN member state to hold this temporary spot). Japan has pledged to pursue its policy of “proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation,” which is also firmly lodged at the heart of the UN. This will certainly include active involvement in the discussion and practice of peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, as well as Japanese contributions — from both human security and national security perspectives — to the newly-set Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

However, acting within the UN alone is not enough, for both the structure and function of this international body need to be majorly adapted to address new 21st-century realities. To this end, reforming the Security Council such that it becomes more representative without losing its effectiveness is an urgent agenda item. Prime Minister Abe’s government has probably been the most active so far in pushing this issue forward, as Abe has repeatedly stated that Japan “seeks to become a permanent member of the Security Council and makes a contribution commensurate with that stature.”⁶

In leaving the WW2 70th anniversary year behind, Japan must jointly move forward with the international community to create a more peaceful world. For this to happen, it is no longer the time to divide the world between the victors and the vanquished from a war that occurred seven decades ago. Acting proactively in a new UN, Japan should play a key part in formulating a new global order. Japan’s expertise and convictions as a peace-enabling country working to advance human security and enhance state resilience will prove to be important assets in the pursuit of this greatest endeavor.

Endnotes

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Human Security: The Way Forward

Kazuo Tase

Policy Objectives

Advance the notion of human security as a guiding principle for the Sustainable Development Goals.

While the term “human security” does not appear in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) or related documents, the notion’s broad and comprehensive approach to humanitarian, development, and peace activities is in line with the aspirational intent of the SDGs.

Context

The concept of human security was first introduced in 1994 in the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report. Shortly after, as the Asian currency crisis emerged, Japan incorporated this concept in 1997 to its diplomacy. Since then, Tokyo has invested tremendous energy, trying to establish the concept of human security as an internationally-recognized, comprehensive, and effective framework that to govern developmental, humanitarian, and peace-building initiatives by the international community.

After an intense competition in the late 1990s with Canada over the definition of human security (Canada essentially tried to mainstream “humanitarian intervention” in the name of “human security”), Japan decided to establish a more concrete conceptual foundation. To this end, Japan worked to bring together world-class intellectuals, including Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, to form the Commission on Human Security. Established in 2000 as an independent consulting body to then-Secretary-General of the UN Kofi Annan, the Commission concluded its work in 2003 with the final report “Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People.”¹

Concurrently, Japan established the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) in March 1999 as a mechanism to operationalize the concept of human security on the ground in developing countries and during humanitarian crises, providing an initial funding of approximately \$5 million. By 2010, Japan had contributed more than \$400 million to the Fund, saving thousands of lives all over the world while promoting the concept of human security and also raising Japan’s international profile.

Following the Commission’s report and Japan’s initiative to establish and support UNTFHS, the United Nations created the Human Security Unit (HSU),

a new unit within the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), to facilitate its work on human security. The HSU and Japan worked closely to encourage other UN member states to adopt the concept of human security in their foreign policy approaches.

In the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the concept of human security was officially recognized by all UN member states for the first time in UN history. However, its definition was left undetermined, to be further discussed in the UN General Assembly (GA).² In 2010, the first Secretary-General's Report on human security explicitly ruled out the use of force as a means to operationalize the concept of human security. In GA Resolution 66/290, adopted on September 10, 2012, UN member states agreed that “human security calls for people-centred, *comprehensive*, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities [*italics added*].”³ The resolution was the reflection of significantly broader international support for the concept of human security. By this time, Canada's definition of human security had been recognized as “Responsibility to Protect,” which now constitutes an important aspect of international humanitarian and peace activities.

On one hand, considering Japan's achievements — including the establishment of the Commission, UNTFHS, and HSU; and recognition of the human security concept in the World Summit Outcome, Secretary-General Report, and GA resolution — it seems that Japan accomplished a great deal in the UN by conceptualizing, operationalizing, and mainstreaming the concept of human security. On the other hand, it should be noted that the term “human security” has not been widely accepted to describe the hands-on humanitarian and developmental operations implemented by UN country teams. More than ninety-nine percent of UNTFHS funding has been provided by Japan alone. More importantly, the term “human security” was not accepted in the negotiations to draft the SDGs towards 2030 despite Japan's intensive diplomatic efforts. While Japan continues to refer to human security as “the guiding principle” of the SDGs, most stakeholders, including NGOs and businesses, are not even familiar with the term or concept. Considering the resources that Japan has invested in the notion, and the added values in it, the current level of its awareness in the international community is far too small.

Why has Japan failed to mainstream the notion despite its initial success in working with the UN Secretariat, establishing UNTFHS, and gathering support in the GA? Considering this will help better understand how the UN functions in international rule-making. This, in turn, could help Japan's future effort to advance the concept of human security, ultimately to be recognized as a guiding principle for the SDGs.

Challenges

Declining status of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security

Japan's biggest success in promoting the human security concept in the UN has been the establishment and management of UNTFHS. Since its establishment in 1999, UNTFHS has had a positive impact in both programmatic and practical ways. The fund can be granted only to UN organizations (institutions bound by UN financial regulations), although these groups are permitted to subcontract operations to civil society organizations. In particular, UNTFHS's unique guidelines differentiated itself from other UN bodies.

First, the guidelines require UN organizations to create “concrete and sustainable benefits to vulnerable people and communities threatened in their survival, livelihood and dignity.”³ Capacity building and policy support for state institutions, international conferences, large infrastructure construction, financial support for recurrent costs in local governments, and any other project with only “indirect” interactions with people on the ground are therefore ineligible for funding. While this policy was welcomed by organizations providing people with longer-term and community-based solutions for humanitarian crises including UN High Commissioner for the Refugees (UNHCR), Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), and UN-Habitat, it was unpopular among institutions focused on supporting development countries' capacity for political and financial decision-making in their central governments. Also, the Fund does not finance any humanitarian operations, since they are not expected to be sustained over a long period of time. While the HSU was housed in OCHA, the Fund functioned quite independently from UN humanitarian policies.

Second, the recipients of the Fund need to be a team of UN organizations that implements a joint project, and the projects need to address more than two issues. For example, FAO, UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and International Labour Organization (ILO) could jointly apply for the Fund to execute a community-based project to support sustainable agriculture, build schools for children, and ensure decent employment opportunities for the local population. These projects should be inter-related to produce synergy. One distinct feature of the Fund is its appreciation for various interconnected aspects of human lives: the Fund's intention has been to see human crises from the perspective of the local populace, and break down the stovepipes and turf wars on the supply side. This is one of the core elements of the concept of human security, as outlined in the 2013 GA resolution.

Third, “empowerment” has been the key concept of operation for UNTFHS. Human security does not assume the existence of functioning governments obligated to ensure populations of their fundamental rights. In many cases, valid governing institutions do not exist in failed states or countries immediately after armed conflicts. Human security places central importance on “protection” of those exposed to threats by the international community. Protection is followed by

“empowerment,” by equipping them with capabilities to build and sustain their own society. The Fund requires all implementing organizations to explicitly incorporate this “from protection to empowerment” approach in the projects it funds.

As such, the Fund has differentiated its programs and projects from other UN activities on the ground. The projects funded by UNTFHS have also generated sustainable positive impacts for recipient populations. The activities of the Fund have been evaluated by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS, the UN’s internal auditing organization) and external development consultants since its establishment, and its activities have been largely endorsed or highly-graded for their achievements, sustainability, and governance.

At the same time, the Fund had some structural and operational shortcomings. These are often related to Japan’s involvement in the creation of the Fund. First, the Fund was created at the suggestion of the government of Japan, under the direction of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General is vested with authority to build general trust funds in the UN Secretariat, so this action was fully consistent with and legitimate under the UN Charter. However, compared to other trust funds created by UN GA resolutions or other frameworks that include multiple member states, UNTFHS was perceived as a fund created by closed-door negotiations between the Secretary-General and Japan. As a result, for at least the first seven years of its operation, the Fund received contributions only from Japan. As the Fund became known as the “Japan Fund,” it gave the misimpression to other member states that the human security concept was a Japanese creation and not an inclusive endeavor.

Second, as discussed earlier, the Fund’s Guidelines did not allow its users to allocate resources for humanitarian operations. Instead, the Fund concentrated its support for “early recovery” and “post-conflict transition from war to peacebuilding.” While this principle was strongly endorsed by OCHA and the Secretary-General, it also “orphaned” the Fund’s activities, which were separated from the rest of OCHA. In the UN, any organization needs institutional support both from within and outside. Because of the Fund’s place within the OCHA, it has often had to depend on the SG’s office’s influence internally and Japan’s financial capacity externally. This has weakened the Fund’s institutional base.

Third and most importantly, Japan wanted to be involved in the Fund’s daily operations. An initial “concept note” from potential applicants needed be officially approved by both HSU and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (the approval was given through the Permanent Mission of Japan in New York) before moving to the next stage of consideration. In the final phase, after HSU approved the proposal, Japan wanted authority not only to grant final approval, but also to request changes to the proposed projects. This made the screening process perplexingly long. In many cases, the situation on the ground changed by the time the project was approved, making the proposed operation obsolete. In particular, when activities required considered seasonal changes or the migration patterns of people, the Fund could not meet expectations of UN teams on the ground.

To be sure, the impact of UNTFHS was not insignificant. It saved lives and empowered a large number of people. UNTFHS's achievements have been recognized by both UN organizations and member states, leading to the GA's endorsement of the concept of human security. However, Japan's dominance of the concept and moreover its management of UNTFHS led to its isolation in the larger UN system. UNTFHS has been suffering from declining financial resources as Japanese contributions to the UN system decline. As a result, compared to other comparable funds such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), both of which have been founded by General Assembly resolutions and thus enjoy collective political support by powerful member states, UNTFHS has diminished in both scale and influence.

Breadth of the Concept: Comprehensive, or Too Vague?

The biggest challenge for the concept of human security is its comprehensiveness. Although it can work as a strength, it has also hindered stakeholders from understanding the concept correctly and fully embracing it. The Secretary-General report repeatedly emphasized the notion's uniqueness:

Member States understood the notion of human security to encompass a people-centred, *comprehensive*, context-specific and prevention-oriented framework through which national capacities could be strengthened. In addition, a number of Member States saw the *added value of human security in compelling policymakers and practitioners to focus on the real needs and the multidimensional insecurities facing people today* [italics added].⁵

On one hand, a number of members states and international organizations have expressed support for the comprehensiveness of the concept, as seen by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)'s position on human security, India's support in the General Assembly, and Switzerland's understanding on the concept, although Switzerland has particularly emphasized the aspect of "freedom from fear."⁶ Support for the breadth of the concept is also found in views from civil society and academia. Gareth Evans has characterized human security as:

Human security was the answer to the need they saw, conceptually and politically, to *link together* in a single coherent framework what had hitherto been the quite separate preoccupations of developed countries with national boundaries and institutions, and military threats and responses, and those of developing countries with feeding, clothing, sheltering, healing and educating their populations. The idea was that whereas issues of state security had dominated international discourse in the past, what really mattered was how all of this affected people's lives. *The concept of human security was broad enough to advance both freedom from fear and freedom from want* [italics added].⁷

On the other hand, however, there are those that do not embrace the concept of human security as understood in the General Assembly. They are reluctant because a) they simply do not recognize the added values of a comprehensive and multidimensional approach; b) they recognize the added value but question the practicality and analytical effectiveness; or c) they propose a different framework. The first points to the most typical criticism against the concept of human security that it is too broad. For instance, David Forsythe has stated:

That discourse is so broad and unlimited that one does not know what it entails. Human security is variously said to entail everything from opposition to war to search for elimination of psychic distress.... I repeat that I am dubious about many aspects of a widespread but amorphous turn to an ill-defined human security discourse. I think one big danger, beyond its lack of clear and limited focus, is its logical tendency thus far to reduce the centrality of human rights and IHL [italics added].⁸

Others understand the notion and its added value, but still challenge its utility. Edward Newman, who participated in the Commission on Human Security in 2000 and 2001, recently wrote:

Human security is normatively attractive, but analytically weak. Through a broad human security lens, anything that presents a critical threat to life and livelihood is a security threat, whatever the source. If individual security is the dependent variable, it is: potential to identify and codify every physiological threat. But this would be of little use, as it would generate an unmanageable array of variables. At the same time, arbitrarily drawing lines to include and exclude certain types of threats is problematic. The academic treatment of human security has foundered on this fundamental conceptual point. If there is disagreement on what should be included as a human security threat — or if this is an arbitrary judgment — then how can human security or variations in human security be reliably measured? How, therefore, can human security be analytically useful? [italics added]⁹

Finally, there are those who do not challenge the definition of the concept of human security, but attempt to use the term to support particular political ideas or relabel existing policies. One example is the relationship between human security and human rights. In many cases, the term “human security” is used interchangeably with “human rights.” For instance, a report by the Center Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on the North Caucasus stated:

This effort would involve increasing the knowledge and understanding within the Russian Federation and the Euro-Atlantic community of the security implications of human rights abuse and impunity (the failure to hold those carrying out abuses accountable for their crimes)—particularly the links between abuse and support for insurgents and terrorists among the Chechen population. This campaign would also advance what is commonly

referred to as the “human security” approach with the Russian and other governments and the donor community, underscoring the fact that human rights issues should be seen as an integral component of all security, humanitarian, socioeconomic, and political problems in the region [italics added].¹⁰

In the above example, the report used the term human security in order to frame the human rights situation in North Caucasus within a national security context. Such usage of the term “human security” is widespread, which confuses audiences and prevents them from appreciating the value added of the concept.

Inclusive Strategy Needed to Mainstream New Notions

Despite these challenges, Japan did make an effort to work with other UN member states and external stakeholders. In fact, Japan intensively sought to gain support for the concept and familiarize the international community with the notion of diplomatic engagement based on this concept, both among member states and in the UN system. One example was Japan’s success in organizing the Friends of Human Security (FHS) group in 2006 to follow up on the World Summit Outcome Document that suggested member states hold continuous discussions on the definition of human security. FHS was created as a forum for UN member states to hold informal, regular discussions to share different areas of focus that may be relevant to human security. Some countries such as Thailand, Mexico, Greece, and Slovenia liked the exchanges and shared what they thought constituted the human security notion, such as appreciation of the multi-dimensionality of and inter-linkages between human lives, and the need for protection and empowerment of people. These elements are consistent with other concepts shared among UN member states, including “Responsibility to Protect,” universality of human rights, and peacebuilding. Countries such as Cuba, Russia, Venezuela, and China that are skeptical of human security also could observe the dialogue and present their concerns, especially in relation to the principle of noninterference in internal affairs. The inclusive nature of FHS contributed to the unanimous support for the 2011 General Assembly draft resolution on human security. However, Japan’s efforts to raise awareness of the human security concept have been limited to persuading friendly nations to endorse Japan’s efforts. Tokyo has been unsuccessful in identifying a partner country that could work with Japan to mainstream the concept. In fact, most European states — even those that endorse the human security concept in the UN — have yet to recognize the distinct added value of the notion or the difference between human security and human rights. This in turn has led them to distance themselves from making financial contributions to the Fund.

Japan was also unwilling to invite other member states to discuss the notion during the initial period of the Commission on Human Security’s establishment. Furthermore, Japan practically selected the individuals to serving on the Commission on Human Security without much consultation with other UN member states.

The US response to the introduction of the concept of human security was interesting. The United States remained silent, because it was fully aware of the difference over the definition of the concept between Canada and Japan. On one hand, Washington did not want to be seen as interventionist and thus was unwilling to support Canada's position. On the other hand, Washington did not want to support Japan's position either, because it seemed too distant from concepts it wanted to promote such as democracy building or human rights. To maintain the G-7 cohesion, keeping silence on human security was probably the best option for Washington.

In the international community, decision-making and norm-building is not a unilateral initiative but a collective action. If a nation hopes to propose a new framework, be it of a conceptual or institutional nature, that country cannot not be scared of facing criticism, adjusting the concept in response to suggestions, and continuously revising it into the future. For instance, the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has emerged, survived, and is widely accepted in today's international community, although it has quite diverted from the original notion of humanitarian intervention that Canada proposed. This is because Canada was open to this concept being subject to global public discussion, accepted criticisms that the notion went beyond the mandate of the UN Charter, and narrowed its focus to what the Security Council can recognize as a threat to international peace and security. While the notion of R2P today may look different from what Canada envisioned when it first proposed the concept, its core aspirations that the international community bears responsibility for protecting civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other atrocities are still embedded in the concept.

Similar isolation of the term human security also took place in academia. Conventional security studies heavily criticized the concept of human security as too ambiguous. Development studies tend to be more understanding of the notion, but they also appear to be unable to grasp what human security could mean on the ground to make tangible differences in development assistance efforts. In other cases, scholars tend to use the term human security to represent a wide range of concepts from human rights, social safety nets, to public social goods. Very few have successfully identified distinctive added value of the notion in light of the challenges in development, as well as the political and social environment that the international community faces today. Here again, Japan has done virtually nothing to involve academia in the scholarly debate over the concept of human security to make it more acceptable as a conceptual framework for scholarly research.

All the international norms and policies that are globally recognized today have endured fierce academic debate and robust political discussions before being recognized as a universal value. Even so, values such as human rights, gender equality, sustainable development, and many other policy notions are still evolving, as more discussion among stakeholders make them stronger and more robust. Human security has not undergone such a process, making it difficult to be accepted as a universal value by the international community.

Policy Recommendations

Define human security as a notion that integrates both physical and psychological security.

The Commission on Human Security defines human security as:

To protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms — freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.¹¹

This definition has become the basis for all subsequent UN engagement in the pursuit of human security, including the Fund, FHS, Secretary-General Report, and General Assembly resolution, as it well captured the needs of the international community in the advent of the new century. In particular, shifting focus from sovereign capacity building to the demands of peoples and communities, in ways to protect and empower populations, was an essential element for paradigm change. What is the vital core for someone's life? Oxygen, water, food, sanitation, and all other physical conditions determine survival. In this context, health is fundamental, as both the Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals have prioritized. Then physical safety and sense of security — a state of mind in which one does not worry about violence, oppression, and persecution — may come next. In the context of human rights, the former has been described as the right to live; the latter as civil and political rights. In the UN Charter, freedom from want and freedom from fear resonate with these fundamental values.

In addition to these basic conditions for survival, however, human beings hope to be happy, fulfilled, or satisfied with their lives. We explore the meaning of our existence. We live in connection to other people and hand over pursuits to next generations. Education is not only for survival, but also to learn the important values that human beings have embraced. Love, hope, dignity, identity, faith, curiosity, and all other reasons for living are significant elements that have distinguished humans from other creatures, and constitute a considerable part of the core of our existence. The challenge is that, in contrast to physical conditions for survival, these psychological values are difficult to gauge, since they are subjective in nature.

The next step to define human security, therefore, will require capturing subjectivity, subjective well-being, or ultimately, happiness.

If the vital core encompasses physical and psychological elements, the definition should also be an integration of the both. The distinct added value of the human security notion may arise from this consideration.

Develop quantifiable indexes to gauge human security such as the Human Security Index that takes into account both objective and subjective parameters for security.

Subjectivity is by definition difficult to quantify. Nonetheless, there have been a number of academic attempts to measure subjective well-being and happiness. If human security is a notion that attempts to integrate the physical (objective) and psychological (subjective) aspects of human lives, the measurement of human security will also need to combine both elements.

For the concept of human security to play a role in global society, it must offer a new perspective that helps to address the existing challenges in today's world. It does not have to be a totally new idea. But if it is essentially a combination of existing notions, it will have to present an innovative approach. Moreover, such a concept should be measured both qualitatively and quantitatively. It needs to be able to stand academic scrutiny and socio-political consideration. It also needs to meet operational needs on the ground.

In this context, it is encouraging to find recent academic initiatives to explore subjectivity, including Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)'s guidelines for measuring subjective well-being. Many existing initiatives to establish an HSI lack such consideration, however. If Japan can lead an effort to establish a Human Security Index (HSI) that take into account this important aspect of our existence, it will go a long way in helping Japan's effort to promote the concept of human security.

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Addressing State Fragility

Kazuto Tsuruga

Policy Objectives

Develop a multi-track mechanism between Japan and the US to address state fragility

As the issue of state fragility becomes a prominent concern internationally, Japan and the US share a strategic interest in addressing how they can mitigate the risks emanating from weak or failing states. Both nations should develop a multi-track mechanism to assess emerging threats, explore options to prevent spillover, and rebuild fragile states.

Strengthen and diversify the support to augment the UN's capacity for crisis management

The United Nations, despite its deficiencies, remains an important forum and instrument for addressing the challenges of state fragility. As major contributors, Japan and the US are ideally positioned to strengthen the UN's crisis management capacity and diversify their respective forms of engagement in UN peace operations.

Create more peacemakers

Japan lacks a talented pool of experts who can help navigate political processes and negotiate solutions. It is imperative to develop more high-level experts in order to be a significant player in international settings dealing with state fragility.

Context

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the issue of the so-called “fragile states” came to the fore of the international peace and security arena. The end of the Cold War predisposed countries across Africa, Latin America, and Asia to lapse into devastating civil wars, and more recently, territories with weak governance have posed threats of global violence.

Statements by US high officials reflect this growing concern for fragile states. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated in 2008:

One of the defining challenges in our world, now and for many years to come, will be to deal with weak and poorly governed states — states that are on the verge of failure or indeed, states that have already failed. These crises create environments of anarchy, and conflict, and ungoverned space — where violence and oppression can spread; where arms traffickers and

other transnational criminals can operate with impunity; and where terrorists and extremists can gather, and plot, and train to kill the innocent. In a world as increasingly connected as ours, the international state system is only as strong as its weakest links.¹

A senior official in the Obama administration expressed a similar sentiment while delivering remarks at New York University in 2009. Susan Rice, then-US Ambassador to the UN and now National Security Advisor, recognized that “a fragile state can also incubate trouble that can spread far beyond its borders. And that is where the transnational threats of the twenty-first century too often begin.”² During the 1990s, however, countries such as the United States regarded nations that lacked stable governing structures almost exclusively through a humanitarian lens, failing to perceive their challenges as strategically significant.³ The US and its partners continued to emphasize counter-insurgency military operations and humanitarian assistance following September 11th, despite warnings from the likes of Chester Crocker who warned against leaving the challenges of fragile states unaddressed:

Unless the United States and its principal partners engage proactively to prevent and contain state failure, rogue regimes may seize power in additional failed or failing states, raising the specter of fresh adversaries that seek WMD and harbor terrorists. Moreover, the United States must learn to rebuild states after overturning their regimes, or the whole enterprise will backfire.⁴

His words proved somewhat prophetic, given the events currently unfolding in Syria and Iraq. It may be too easy — and probably unfair — to finger-point or criticize inaction retrospectively, as no one could have predicted the emergence of extremist groups such as the Islamic State (IS). Nevertheless, a catastrophic situation in Syria has resulted in a large influx of refugees into EU territories and in violent terrorist attacks in Paris, Istanbul, Jakarta, California, and elsewhere. These incidents attest to the fact that no country is invulnerable or free from the direct or indirect consequences if situations in fragile states remain unaddressed.

In order to tackle with the challenges that state fragility poses, the US initiated a number of changes in its governmental structure and strategies following 9/11. In 2004, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) — replaced in 2011 by the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) — to enhance intra-agency cooperation across US government agencies. US Agency for International Development (USAID) developed the Fragile State Strategy in 2005, and the Obama administration followed the approach to pursue better inter-agency coordination to address this issue. Both its 2010 and 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Reviews (QDDR) focused on preventing nations from turning into fragile states. The QDDR also acknowledged that the concerted effort by international

community is necessary in order to curtail violent extremism and minimize the negative impact of state fragility. As Stewart Patrick noted:

To bolster fragile states, the United States must leverage the capabilities of international partners who also have interests at stake in improving governance in — and preventing spillover from — the developing world. Washington should work with other donor countries and institutions — including the OECD, G20 and G8, United Nations, World Bank and regional organizations — to forge multilateral consensus on priority global challenges, country specific requirements for effective state building, the development of joint country plans, and equitable burden sharing in financing and implementing external aids.⁵

Can Japan be an important player in this regard? A long-time US ally and an influential member of all international forum and organizations, Japan seems to have the qualifications to occupy a unique role in the concerted international efforts to deal with state fragility. But does it have the capacity or intention to do so? This article attempts to examine the potential roles Japan can play as a US partner in addressing the challenges associated with state fragility, and assess its strengths and weaknesses. It concludes with a few policy recommendations for the Japan-US partnership in this area for the future.

State Fragility: Concept and Scope

Prior to examining the Japan-US partnership, it is necessary to first understand what is meant by the phrase “fragile state.” According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “a fragile state has weak capacity to carry out basic functions of governing a population and its territory, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society.”⁶ However, there is no universally agreed-upon definition of state fragility, despite many attempts to categorize or quantify the concept. For instance, in 2008, Stewart Patrick and Susan Rice created the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World. Using security, political, economic, and social welfare indicators (Table 1), the Index measures the performance of 141 countries. According to this method, Somalia ranked the weakest, followed by Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).⁷

Another example is Fragile States Index developed by the Fund for Peace in 2005. Based on the twelve primary social, economic, and political indicators, it provides annual risk assessment for 178 countries. The latest Fragile States Index in 2015 identifies South Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic and Sudan as “Very High Alert,” and Finland as “Very Sustainable.”⁸

OECD, for its part, also has been issuing numerous publications on state fragility and providing toolkits for policymakers. In its recent report, it calls for a more universal approach to assessing internal stability that would capture diverse aspects of risk and vulnerability.¹⁰ It proposes five clusters of fragility indicators: violence;

Table 1. Index of State Weakness in the Developing World⁸

ECONOMIC	POLITICAL	SECURITY	SOCIAL WELFARE
1. GNI per capita, 2006 (World Bank, World Development Indicators)	6. Government Effectiveness, 2006 (World Bank, Governance Matters VI)	11. Conflict Intensity, 1992-2006 (Center for Systemic Peace, Major Episodes of Political Violence)	16. Child Mortality, 2005 (UNICEF, State of the World's Children)
2. GDP growth, 2002-2006 (World Bank, World Development Indicators)	7. Rule of Law, 2006 (World Bank, Governance Matters VI)	12. Political Stability and Absence of Violence, 2006 (World Bank, Governance Matters VI)	17. Primary School Completion, 2005 (World Bank, World Development Indicators)
3. Income Inequality, 2006 (World Bank, World Development Indicators)	8. Voice and Accountability, 2006 (World Bank, Governance Matters VI)	13. Incidence of Coups, 1992-2006 (Archigos 2.8 and Economist Intelligence Unit)	18. Undernourishment, 2004 (Food and Agriculture Organization)
4. Inflation, 2002-2006 (International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics)	9. Control of Corruption, 2006 (World Bank, Governance Matters VI)	14. Gross Human Rights Abuses, 1992-2006 (Political Terror Scale)	19. Percent Population with Access to Improved Water Sources, and with Access to Improved Sanitation Facilities, 2004 (World Bank, World Development Indicators)
5. Regulatory Quality, 2006 (World Bank, Governance Matters VI)	10. Freedom Ratings, 2006 (Freedom House)	15. Territory Affected by Conflict, 1991-2005 (Political Instability Task Force)	20. Life Expectancy, 2005 (World Bank, World Development Indicators)

Note: For each indicator, the researchers sought to use the latest data available. Most of the data sources used were published in 2007, and most of the data were for the years indicated above. For more detailed information on data sources and the aggregation process see the "Technical Annex" (page 29).

access to justice; effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions; economic inclusion and stability; and the capacity to prevent and adapt to social, economic, and environmental shocks and disasters.¹¹

The abovementioned indices are by no means exhaustive, but what is common across various attempts to measure state fragility is that this challenge is multi-dimensional and cannot be addressed only with military actions. Although most indices identify African countries such as Somalia, Sudan, or DRC as dangerously fragile states, they do not necessarily mean that those countries are automatically prioritized by the international community for support. Rather, these countries often become so-called "aid orphans," receiving very little attention and support despite the severity and scope of their situation. Fragile states pose serious threats, but their nature is different from extreme terrorism or proliferation of weapons. Therefore, the concerned countries make a choice on when, if at all, or how to intervene, based on their respective strategic calculations and available resources.

In sum, state fragility encompasses diverse political, social, and economic aspects and requires multi-dimensional approaches for addressing it. The challenge for Japan-US cooperation in this area, therefore, is a question of whether or when the

respective strategic calculations align enough to make sense for cooperation, and whether sufficient resources are available to achieve those shared strategic goals.

Challenges

To identify the strengths and weakness of Japan in dealing with state fragility, three aspects are worth examining: financial contributions, allocation of personnel resources, and commitment to the political settlement process in fragile states.

Japan and the United States: Financial Contributions

Both Japan and the US are undoubtedly major contributors to the developing world. As Table 2 shows, the US far surpasses all other financial contributors for providing assistance to fragile states and economies. Japan ranks 4th after the European Union, International Development Association (IDA) which is a part of the World Bank and the UK.

Japan has been a major contributor of official development assistance (ODA) since the 1970s, reflecting its strong economic growth at the time. Japan became the world's fourth-largest donor in 1972. In 1989, Japan surpassed the United States to become the world's largest donor with its ODA reaching \$8.97 billion. Japan remained the world's top donor throughout most of the 1990s. Japan's ODA contribution declined in the early 2000s, but it has been gradually recovering in recent years. Moreover, there have been some noticeable shifts in the area of assistance that Japan's ODA has been directed to in recent years. Japanese ODA historically focused on infrastructure, agriculture, health, and education. But "peacebuilding" has become an important pillar of ODA since the early 2000s, recognizing the significance of dealing with fragile states after 9/11. The appointment of Sadako Ogata, a former UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 2003 was indicative of this recalibration.

The Japanese Development Cooperation Charter (known as the ODA Charter) in 2003 prioritized peacebuilding, prompting JICA to reallocate ODA funds to post-conflict assistance for regions such as Afghanistan, East Timor, Iraq, Aceh (Indonesia), Mindanao (Philippines), and Sri Lanka. The revised Charter, announced in February 2015, expands its commitment to peacebuilding:

All kinds of risks in every part of the world can have a direct negative impact on the peace, stability and prosperity of the world including Japan. These risks range from transboundary challenges such as...threats to the peace and stability of the international community such as international terrorism, transnational organized crimes, and piracy, to humanitarian issues in fragile states, regional conflicts and political stability...In case the armed forces or members of the armed forces in recipient countries are involved in development cooperation for non-military purposes such as public welfare or disaster-relief purposes, such cases will be considered on a case-by-case basis in light of their substantive relevance.¹²

This carefully crafted statement, though it still causes some critics to raise eyebrows, potentially opens up a new area to allocate ODA. JICA's newly-appointed President Shinichi Kitaoka chaired an advisory panel discussing the legal basis for reinterpreting Article 9 of the Constitution to enable Japan to both exercise the right to collective self-defense and play a greater role in UN peacekeeping operations. The recommendations by the advisory panel eventually paved the way for the Cabinet decision on collective self-defense and roles for the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in July 2015. Though the full impact of this new direction remains to be seen, it would likely encourage a closer linkage of ODA with Japan's national security policy goals.

Financial contribution to UN peacekeeping operations is an important tool for the international community to address state fragility. In this area, the US and Japan both have been the top contributors. For the 2013-2015 budget cycle, the US and Japan together shouldered nearly 40% of all the financial contributions for UN peacekeeping; the shares of the US and Japan were 28.3% and 10.83%, respectively. The total contributions by the remaining four permanent members of the UN Security Council — France, UK, China, and Russia — amounted to a combined share of just 23%.¹³

The US and Japan are also major donors to other UN entities, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), all of which provide on-the-ground assistance to fragile states. All this to say, Japan has sufficient financial capacity to address state fragility.

Emphasizing financial contributions may invite criticism against Japan for resorting to “checkbook” diplomacy. That said, the point here is not the amount or share of contributions per se, but rather how Japan can leverage its position to have the greatest possible influence on policymaking or rulemaking, either in bilateral or multilateral settings. The financial wherewithal is a prerequisite to exert influence, but it needs to be matched with other resources, particularly the collective expertise accumulated from past experiences and talented professionals who could serve as the building blocks for policy formulation.


Japan's Track Record in Personnel Contributions

Until the end of the Cold War, Japan had been a rather cautious participant on issues pertaining to international peace and security, as it tried to distance itself from its militarist past. The pacifism that took root among the general public and the strong desire to rebuild the war-torn homeland led Tokyo to focus on its economic development, keeping a low profile in the international security arena.

This is not to say Japan's effort to engage in international diplomacy during the Cold War was nonexistent. In the United Nations, Japan was voted to become a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 1957, just one year after Japan acquired UN membership in 1956. Subsequently, Japan served as a non-permanent

Japan as a Peace Enabler

Table 2. Providers of official development assistance to fragile states and economies (2012, USD)¹⁴



UNSC member six times between 1956 and 1986. However, the paralysis within the UN Security Council due to Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union limited the role that Japan could play as a non-permanent member, particularly vis-à-vis the five permanent UN Security Council members.

Nonetheless, Tokyo's desire to move beyond economic assistance was expressed when Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda issued the "Fukuda Doctrine" in 1977, in which he articulated Japan's desire to engage with ASEAN member countries as well as the communist regime in the region. Although Japan's attempts to broker a peace settlement in Cambodia in the 1980s did not accomplish much, the "Fukuda doctrine" was the first manifestation of Japan's commitment to play an active role.¹⁵

The turning point for Japan was the painful experience with regard to its much criticized "checkbook" diplomacy during the Gulf War in 1991. Providing only financial assistance and very little personnel contribution (although it sent minesweepers after the combat was over), Japan's response to the Gulf crisis was criticized as "too little, too late." Domestically, the issue was fiercely debated in the Diet and attracted considerable media attention with the persistence of public skepticism towards JSDF involvement in international affairs. When Japan, despite its heavy financial burden-sharing, was not acknowledged in the *New York Times* advertisement by Kuwait appreciating the multinational support during the war, it was considered a national embarrassment.

This experience, known as the Gulf War "trauma," prompted the Japanese government to shift its policy toward engaging in UN peacekeeping operations, and its first effort was in Cambodia. Japan's participation in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was made possible through the enactment of the PKO Act in June 1992, albeit with strict conditions. Indeed, the notion of deploying the JSDF overseas elicited loud criticism domestically, amplified by the loss of two Japanese citizens (one UN volunteer and one policeman). Still, Japan was able to contribute. Although the grand design for the peace settlement in Cambodia was largely drawn by the five permanent UNSC members (P5), the combination of diplomatic efforts for political settlement among the Cambodian factions, and appointment of Yasushi Akashi (the first Japanese citizen to join the UN Secretariat in 1957 and serving as Under-Secretary-General for Public Information at that time) as a special representative of the secretary general (SRSG) in 1992, Japan played a role beyond economic assistance and established its own presence within the international arena.¹⁶ The Japanese experience in Cambodia was thus largely regarded as a success, paving the way for subsequent engagements and the deployment of the JSDF, police, and civilian personnel to UN peacekeeping operations beyond Asia, including Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Sudan, and Haiti.

Apart from peacekeeping operations, the JSDF engaged in emergency humanitarian rescues in Rwanda, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq. JSDF personnel also operated as part of Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) teams eighteen

Table 3. Deployment of Japanese personnel to UN Peacekeeping Operations (based on the International Peace Cooperation Act) as of April 2015

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations			
Operation Names	Type of Personnel	Period	Total # of Personnel*
1. Angola (UNAVEM II)	Electoral Observers	Sep.- Oct. 1992	3
2. Cambodia (UNTAC)	Military Observers	Sep. 1992 - Sep. 1993	16
	Civilian Police	Oct. 1992 - Jul. 1993	75
	Troops (Engineering Unit)	Sep. 1992 - Sep. 1993	1,200
	Electoral Observers	May - Jun. 1993	41
3. Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Staff Officers	May 1993 - Jan. 1995	10
	Troops (Movement Control Unit)	May 1993 - Jan. 1995	144
	Electoral Observers	Oct. - Nov. 1994	15
4. El Salvador (ONUSAL)	Electoral Observers	Mar. - Apr. 1994	30
5. Golan Heights (UNDOF)	Staff Officers	Feb. 1996 - Jan. 2013	38
	Transport Troops	Feb. 1996 - Jan. 2013	1,463
6. East Timor (UNAMET)	Civilian Police	Jul.- Sep. 1999	3
7. East Timor (UNTAET)	Troops (Engineering Unit)	Mar. - May 2002	680
	Staff Officers	Feb. - May 2002	10
8. East Timor (UNMISET)	Troops (Engineering Unit)	May. 2002 - Jun. 2004	1,607
	Staff Officers	May 2002 - Jun. 2004	7
9. East Timor (UNMIT)	Civilian Police	Jul. 2007 - Feb. 2008	4
10. Nepal (UNMIN)	Military Observers	Mar. 2007 - Jan. 2011	24
11. Sudan (UNMIS)	Staff Officers	Oct. 2008 - Sep. 2011	12
12. Haiti (MINUSTAH)	Troops (Engineering Unit)	Feb. 2012 - Feb. 2013	2,184
	Staff Officers	Feb. 2010 - Jan. 2013	12
13. East Timor (UNMIT)	Military Liaison Officers	Sep. 2010 - Sep. 2012	8
14. South Sudan (UNMISS)	Staff Officers	Nov. 2011 - present	19
	Troops (Engineering Unit)	Jan. 2012 - present	2,440
Total			10,045

* Total number of personnel includes extension of personnel for renewed mission mandate, hence, for some missions, it is not the absolute number of personnel deployed each time.

times between 1998 and 2015, primarily to rescue disaster-affected populations in countries such as Honduras, Turkey, India, Iran, and Indonesia, but also for unique recent cases such as the outbreak of the Ebola virus in Ghana and rescue operations for missing Malaysian and Indonesian airplanes in 2014. While these activities were largely uncontested, the dispatch of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) vessels to the Indian Ocean for refueling operations for the US and its coalition partners in Afghanistan (which ended in 2010), and subsequent JMSDF participation in patrols off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to protect ships from piracy, were perceived domestically controversial.

Overall, Japan has steadily increased its engagements in overseas conflict situations. The scope of permissible JSDF participation has also broadened. In terms of sending personnel to these operations, Japan seems to have overcome its earlier shortcoming to a certain extent. The challenge now is that the government seems to be too focused on increasing JSDF deployment in these operations, and other types of commitment receive little attention. Japan's new security legislation — approved September 19, 2015 by the Diet — would allow the JSDF to protect civilians or personnel engaged in UN peacekeeping and to use weapons when necessary. This may be a significant change. But the new legislation does not take into account the broader challenges that UN peace operations are facing that cannot be resolved only by military involvement.

One area Japan should consider again is deployment of police personnel. In contrast to JSDF continued engagement in peacekeeping operation, police deployment has been very limited since Cambodia, with only a few policemen dispatched to operations in East Timor. The loss of National Policy Agency officers in Cambodia might have been traumatic, but given the multidimensional mandate granted to peacekeeping operations, the roles that police personnel can play are increasingly important. In fact, UN officials have expressed their desire to see more Japanese policemen participating in peacekeeping operations.¹⁷

Commitment to the Political Process

With significant ODA and increased personnel contributions in place, active engagement in the political processes in dealing with fragile states might be the last element for Japan to truly provide its “Proactive Contribution to Peace” as declared by Prime Minister Abe. Diplomatic skill to broker peace settlements or mitigate the risks of violence is essential if Japan is to play the role of a proactive partner, rather than mere well-mannered cash and/or service provider to international efforts to manage state fragility.

In the case of Cambodia, Japan demonstrated a combination of financial, personnel, and political commitment. The applicability of the success in Cambodia to today's fragile states is doubtful, however, because Cambodia in the 1990s did not pose a serious threat of terrorism, WMD proliferation, or organized crime to the rest of the world. Rather, it can be considered as a classic case of a contained civil war requiring resolution to end atrocities against its own people. To be sure, peace in Cambodia was obviously essential not only

for stability in Southeast Asia, but also for the human security of its native population. But with the Cold War dynamics fading, the conditions might have been also ripe for a solution, and it needs to be questioned what can be applied to present-day state fragility.

In Afghanistan, for example, the situation was more complicated. Japan's aspiration to play a key role in post-conflict reconstruction was clear when it hosted a donor conference in 2002. However, Japan could not take an active role in peace negotiations leading up to the Bonn Agreement in December 2001, and unlike JSDF participation in UN peacekeeping in Cambodia, Japan could participate in neither Operation Enduring Freedom, a US-led military operation to oust the Taliban regime, nor the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The scope of these operations — the former being a pure counter-insurgency military campaign and the latter being non-UN peacekeeping operation — were simply beyond what was envisaged by the PKO Act, and there was no legal framework to authorize JSDF participation in these operations. To find a path to support the coalition, the Koizumi administration enacted the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law, which permitted the JMSDF to assist the coalition partners in the Indian Ocean. But it continued to be a source of domestic political tension throughout the Koizumi, Abe, and Fukuda administrations until it was terminated in 2010. Japan therefore concentrated mainly on economic assistance. One exception might be its support for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former Afghan combatants. As Yuji Uesugi noted, “as Japan dispatch[ed] its armed forces to Afghanistan, and because of its unique commitment to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, Japan was able to fulfill a special role that no one could have played in the implementation of DDR.”⁸ Still, Japan was strained to wield influence over the complex political process unfolding in Afghanistan. Japan also missed opportunities to play a significant political role in Aceh and Sri Lanka.

The absence of a pool of talented people who are trained to play a role of peacemakers has arguably created the largest drag on Japan's progress as a global leader in peacemaking. Initiatives such as the creation of the Hiroshima Peacebuilding Center merit recognition, but Japan needs experts both in and outside of government who can help navigate political processes in fragile states and who are capable of crisis management. There have been only two SRSGs, Yasushi Akashi and Sukehiro Hasegawa (who served in East Timor) who have served in top-level positions in UN peacekeeping operation missions. There are also seasoned Japanese diplomats, but there seems to be little interest in giving up careers in the Japanese Foreign Service to serve in UN missions.

Identifying those individuals who can assume high-level leadership positions in UN agencies is a serious challenge. Beyond veterans like the former UNHCR Commissioner Sadako Ogata and Yasushi Akashi, there seems to be no individual who can be the Jimmy Carter, Gareth Evans, or Martti Ahtisaari of Japan. There is thus an acute need to create a system within Japan to identify and develop the experts who are capable of leading UN efforts in dealing with fragile states.


Cooperation with the US

Both the US and Japan lack an agency that can serve as an anchor for government-wide efforts to work comprehensively on issues related to state fragility. In the US, as mentioned earlier, the Bureau of Conflict and Management was established within State Department in 2011 to replace S/CRS, but it still suffers from an “identity problem”: its mission has been unclear to many within and outside the State Department, even to some of its staff.¹⁹ Neither does Japan have a focal point or interagency coordinating mechanism in place to deal with various aspects of state fragility. In this context, the newly-established National Security Secretariat (NSS) within the Cabinet Secretariat may have the potential to play a central role. While the current NSS mandate is to support the National Security Council (NSC), which obviously focuses on the more pressing security challenges that are closer to Japanese borders, NSS can certainly encourage policy discussions on fragile states in the rest of the world, helping to develop a “whole-of-government” strategy for addressing fragile states.

For bilateral cooperation, the existing Japan-US Security Consultative Committee can serve as an effective platform between the two nations to exchange information or to formulate a joint strategy to tackle emerging threats posed by state fragility. In addition to the official channel of the Japan-US alliance, it is important particularly in Japan to deepen understanding and strengthen analytical capacity for state fragility. For instance, Japan can learn a great deal from working with experts and scholars in the US to utilize analytical resources on state fragility that can feed into policymaking. Japan seems to lag far behind the US and other donor countries in analytical capacity for fragile states. Even the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), one of the leading think tanks in Asia, and the JICA Research Institute do not produce up-to-date analysis on state fragility, except for occasional stand-alone reports. Academic institutions and non-profit organizations in Japan lack sufficient means to regularly conduct systematic risk assessments of fragile states. Limited English and other foreign language proficiency among parliamentarians and policymakers make it difficult for them to gain the most updated information.

Japan and the US can also better utilize UN peace operations. For Japan, collaboration within the UN framework would definitely cause less political controversy, making Japanese participation more palatable to the general public. On the other hand, the US needs to bring a better balance between the military and civilian components of its engagement.²⁰ As shown by the figure below, the US personnel contribution to UN peacekeeping operation is very small.²¹ There is obviously a number of reasons for this lack of commitment: enduring skepticism towards UN by the Congress, a traumatizing experience in Somalia, and the need to concentrate its military resources to Afghanistan and Iraq.

While speaking at a peacekeeping summit held at the UN on September 28, 2015, President Obama pledged to provide logistical support and double the



number of US military officers deployed on UN peacekeeping missions.²² Prime Minister Abe, in response, announced Japan’s support for the UN Project for African Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities (ARDEC) and training of peacekeepers.²³ These are welcome steps in a positive direction, but Tokyo and Washington can go further.

One potential area for Japan-US collaboration is in the deployment of police personnel. Both Japan and the US might be able to jointly consider how the two nations can cooperate in police deployment, security sector reform, and training of local police. The two countries can also collaborate on efforts to strengthen the UN’s capacity to prevent conflict and mediate peace settlements. As stated in the June 2015 *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, “lasting peace is achieved not through military and technical engagements, but through political solutions.”²⁴ Instead of focusing narrowly on deployment, Japan should invest more in efforts to expand its pool of talented individuals who can take leadership in solving problems in fragile states. Instead of just pledging economic assistance in response to UN requests, Japan should proactively engage in politically complex situations at the earliest stages by leveraging its strong partnership with US.

Policy Recommendations

Regularize the discourse on state fragility between the US and Japan at the highest levels, utilizing mechanisms such as the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee, and when appropriate, include USAID and JICA in policy discussions on support for fragile states

While the core mission of the Japan-US alliance remains stability in East Asia, both nations should exchange information and engage in discussion on possible threats spilling out of fragile states. It would therefore be worthwhile to consider the issue at high-level policy discussions such as the bilateral Security Consultative Committee. Inviting implementing agencies such as USAID and JICA to discuss joint measures to prevent crises might be advisable.

Encourage think tanks and research institutions to work closely on various aspects of state fragility

Research institutions and think tanks in both nations have a long history of collaboration on various topics. That said, Japan lags far behind the US in political analysis of state fragility and its possible implications for national security and the national interest. It would be wise for Japanese scholars, researchers, and analysts to work with their American counterparts to deepen their understanding of up-to-date trends affecting fragile states and possible threats from their continued instability, which in turn would be effective in informing policymakers for formulating strategies.

Consider deploying more police personnel to UN peace operations

While the role of police in recent UN peace operations is increasingly critical and demands are high, both Japan and the US fall short when it comes to deploying police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. Neither President Obama's recent commitment to double US personnel for UN peacekeeping nor Japan's new security legislation make reference to police deployment. Still, both Japan and the US should revamp their strategy to better leverage their substantial police capabilities in the international arena.

Strengthen the UN's capacity for crisis prevention and mediation efforts

Strengthening support for prevention is, at least in theory, more cost effective than responding to crises militarily. The preventive approach also aligns with the shrinking US appetite — spurred by prolonged involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq — for military engagement and diffuses controversy of deploying the JSDF to complex peace operations. Empowering the UN Secretariat to focus on prevention

is long overdue, but it still upsets UN member states that see it as a possible tool for some developed countries to interfere with domestic affairs. It is therefore of strategic importance for both Japan and the US to explore options for supporting the UN Secretariat and other UN agencies in the effort to develop sophisticated means of preventing fragile states from falling apart and, when necessary, mediating political settlements.

Invest in civilian resources and broaden the pool of future peacemakers

Last but not least, Japan needs to broaden its talent pool of peacemakers. In that regard, the Japanese government can encourage mobility of professionals in political parties, the Foreign Service, Ministry of Defense, UN organizations, and academia so that young talented individuals can gain the comprehensive knowledge and skills necessary to be future peacemakers.

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Developing Human Resources for Peace¹

Yuji Uesugi

Policy Objectives

Increase the number of Japanese civilians who are willing to work in the field of peacebuilding and contribute to the international community by offering non-Japanese citizens an opportunity to take part in this program.

The Japanese government considers the number of civilian Japanese with expertise in the field of peacebuilding to be fewer than desired and seeks to support the international community by enhancing such civilian capacity. Human resource development for non-Japanese civilians in peacebuilding would provide an avenue for Japan to contribute to the international community, enhancing civilian capacity in the field of peacebuilding through training programs specifically targeted at civilians interested in engaging in peacebuilding activities.

Context

Japan seeks to contribute to global peace and security as a member of the international community. Since the number of civilian nationals in the field of peacebuilding is not ideal and can be further expanded, the Japanese government has intensified efforts to develop the civilian capacity in the area of *kokusai heiwa kyoryoku*, or “International Peace Cooperation” (IPC), over the past 15 years.² The most concrete example of Japan’s efforts in this area is the launch of the Human Resource Development in Asia for Peacebuilding (HRDAP) program. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officially launched the program in 2009, following a two-year trial phase beginning in 2007.

Akashi Report

The roots of the HRDAP program can be found in the “Akashi report” issued in 2002 by the Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace, chaired by Yasushi Akashi:

International peace cooperation should now be positioned as one of the fundamental tasks of the government and for this purpose ... a *training system established for human resources*. ... The report recommends the creation of an organic mechanism, including existing organizations, which will enable the efficient and *comprehensive development, training,*

recruitment and dispatch of human resources. It is necessary to promote various registration systems for human resources and create a network of them, promote theoretical analysis on international peace cooperation, and to create comprehensive career plans with regard to those engaged in international peace cooperation activities [italics added].³

Prior to the launch of the HRDAP pilot program in 2007, Japanese civilian participation in IPC had been sporadic and unorganized, lacking systematic support from the government. Of course, there were pioneers such as Yasushi Akashi, Sadako Ogata, and Sukehiro Hasegawa, who worked their way up the IPC career ladder without such systematic governmental support. However, if the Japanese government wishes to considerably increase the number of IPC civilian Japanese experts, it needs a coherent policy to develop such a personnel pool.

At present, the incentive structure is inadequate. For example, while Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) personnel and government officials who are seconded to an IPC mission after their term in the IPC mission ends may return to their place of origin, individuals who do not work for the government face a totally different situation if they wish to develop their career in the IPC field. Those in the latter category must have a long-term career vision and “reentry” plans, given the very closed, inflexible, and conservative job market in Japan. On this issue, the 2002 Akashi report indicated that the Advisory Group was well aware that the issue of human resource development must be addressed in a comprehensive manner that extends beyond mere “training” exercises. The report also emphasized that the Advisory Group was interested in expanding “non-government” civilian contributions to IPC, as its recommendation calls for “comprehensive career plans” for those other than JSDF and other government personnel.⁴

Terakoya Speech

Responding to the recommendations made by the Akashi report, then-Foreign Minister Taro Aso delivered a speech in August 2006 entitled, “A School to Build Peace Builders.”⁵ The former foreign minister declared, “We will be creating *terakoya* to foster human resource development for peacebuilding.” He emphasized, “Peacebuilding is a job that requires a broad range of human resources... Everyone can become an instrument in the building of peace... In order to build and maintain peace, a large number of civilians are also necessary. And it is the civilians that Japan wants to send out in increasing numbers in the future.” His speech also outlined Japan’s key national interests and policy goals in relation to the modest number of Japanese civilians involved in various UN missions. Indeed, the former foreign minister urged Japanese lawmakers to “work to correct this situation, re-dyeing to a new hue the banner of ‘Japan — a nation of peace’ that we have been bearing.”⁶

Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center

Under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration, Hiroshima University successfully implemented the pilot phase of the HRDAP (FY 2007-2008) through a partnership with the United Nations Volunteers (UNVs). Subsequently, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) defeated the LDP in the summer of 2009 and went on to form a new government on September 16. The new DPJ administration decided to review the budgets approved by the former government in order to cut wasteful government expenditures, potentially including the HRDAP program. Nevertheless, the program was officially inaugurated under the DPJ government in 2009, and MOFA successfully articulated to their new political leadership that sustaining the program was consistent with Japan's national interests and a political objective supported by both the LDP and DPJ: filling a critical civilian capacity gap in peacebuilding.

A non-governmental organization (NGO) in Hiroshima called Peacebuilders implemented the newly-inaugurated program, and though Hiroshima University was no longer the institutional implementer, the program maintained continuity by way of two core figures from Hiroshima University who joined the NGO and established the Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center (HPC) to put the HRDAP program into effect (HPC was originally established under the joint auspices of Hiroshima University and Peacebuilders, but obtained independent legal status in 2011).⁷ Given Hiroshima's special resonance among those committed to the notion of international peace both in and outside of Japan, the program quickly gained recognition by the international community and relevant agencies working in the field of peacebuilding. By allowing the HPC, an NGO, to implement the program, the HRDAP took a positive step on the path encouraged by the Akashi report, promoting cooperation between government and non-government sectors for "the creation of an organic mechanism... which will enable the efficient and comprehensive development, training, recruitment and dispatch of human resources."⁸

Outline of the Program

The main component of the HRDAP program is dubbed the "Primary Course," in which Program Associates (PAs; participants of the program) spend six weeks completing coursework in Japan, followed by an overseas assignment in the field as UNVs. Non-Japanese PAs initially hailed from East and Southeast Asia, but the demography of non-Japanese PAs has gradually grown to include individuals from South Asia (Sri Lanka, Nepal, India, and Pakistan) and Central Asia/Middle East (Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq). In 2014, the initiative was renamed the "Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding" (HRDP) program and began recruiting PAs from Africa (Ethiopia, Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia, and Democratic Republic of Congo) as well.

Although there were a number of minor changes, the basic structure of the program remained unchanged from its launch in 2007 through 2014. In 2015, based

on the recommendations set forth by the “Panel of Experts on Peacebuilding,” chaired by former Ambassador Yoshio Hatano, MOFA restructured its existing programs, making HRDP part of the larger “Global Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding and Development” (GHRDPD) effort.⁹

The 2015 program has not yet been completed, and it is therefore premature to provide any assessment of its effectiveness. As for the programs pursued between 2007 and 2014, over 300 Japanese and non-Japanese have taken part in various forms of the HRDAP/HRDP programs (identified henceforth as HRDP), which consist of four distinct parts:¹⁰

The main component is the Primary Course, which aims to include fifteen Japanese and fifteen non-Japanese PAs from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, all of whom possess two or more years of professional experience in fields relevant to peacebuilding (e.g. law, administration, education, public health, media, air traffic control, and logistics support). The course has two parts: six weeks of coursework in Japan and a twelve-month overseas assignment as a UNV.

The second component entails “Career Development Support,” by which the program provides advisory services related to career development for Japanese PAs and maintains a database of current and former PAs for networking purposes. Both elements establish the program as a true “human resource development” endeavor, rather than a mere one-time training opportunity for PAs.

The third component is the “Basic Seminar on Peacebuilding.” It aims to encourage Japanese applicants with diverse backgrounds to engage in the field of peacebuilding by offering a five-day intensive lecture series covering the basics taught in the Primary Course. The Basic Seminar has been offered every year since FY 2009, and about thirty Japanese — some of whom later applied and were accepted into the Primary Course — participate each year.

The fourth component is a training program targeted towards individuals with greater work experience. It bears a similar format to that of the Primary Course, even including an overseas UNV assignment, with only application qualifications (such as the minimum age and requisite experience) distinguishing the two components. Unlike the other three components, the fourth has not been offered

Table 1: Statistics on the PAs

	COURSE TITLE	Number		COURSE TITLE	Number
	Japanese	Primary Course		119	Non-Japanese
Civilian Expert Course		19	Civilian Expert Course	13	
Senior Specialist Course		10	Senior Specialist Course	9	
Peacebuilding Workshop		16	-	-	

every year. It was advanced as a “Senior Specialist Course” in FY 2009, only to be offered as the “Civilian Experts Course” a year later. In 2014, a two-day “Workshop on Peacebuilding,” targeting participants with five or more years of professional experience in peacebuilding, was conducted.

One of the strengths of the Primary Course is the opportunity it affords Japanese PAs to accumulate on-the-ground experience through overseas UNV assignments. Between 2007 and 2014, Japanese PAs traveled to eighty-five overseas locations for their UNV assignments. Those who wished to join a UN mission, including special political missions such as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), were employed via regular UNV contract, as UN regulations prohibit UN missions from hiring UNVs with government affiliations in order to maintain strict impartiality. UNVs of the HRDP program are seen as being tied to the Japanese government due to their sources of funding.

Some PAs who were actively seeking employment while completing the HRDP program left the program upon securing a new post. MOFA has recognized such cases as a “successful” story of career development, treating such PAs as graduates rather than dropouts of the program. MOFA deserves much credit for demonstrating such flexibility.

Table 2 represents the outlook of the overseas UNV assignments for FY 2013 (no data had been made publicly available for FY 2014 at the time of writing). Fifteen Japanese and one non-Japanese PAs were given UNV assignments. Among them, four were sent to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), three to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), three to the World Food Programme (WFP), two to the United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees (UNHCR), and the remaining four to other UN organizations. To be sure, UNDP, UNICEF, and UNHCR have been major host organizations for the PAs’ UNV assignments since the inception of the program, and although no PAs were sent to the International Organization of Migration (IOM) in FY 2013, IOM has accepted several PAs in the past.

As evident in Table 2, PAs assumed a variety of positions, ranging from a Peacebuilding Officer to a Disaster Risk Management Officer, in seven different UN organizations in fifteen overseas locations.

The ability of PAs to secure employment upon completing the program says much about the value of the human resource development program. In this area, the HRDP’s records have been quite impressive. Some Japanese PAs, for instance, were able to extend their contracts as UNVs or serve as consultants in the same office where they had been stationed during their UNV assignment for the HRDP program. Others — twenty-two, to be exact — were successfully selected as Junior Professional Officers (JPO). The JPO program is another government-sponsored program, allowing young professionals to work within the UN system on two-year contracts at the P2 rank (professional entry level).¹¹ The HRDP program has thus increasingly been recognized as a gateway to the JPO program, and, as a result, pre-departure training for JPO will be included in the terms of reference of the new HRDP program beginning in FY 2015.

Furthermore, PAs in earlier iterations of the program have successfully leveraged

Table 2: PAs' UNV Assignment in FY 2013

OVERSEAS LOCATIONS	ORGANIZATION	POSITION
India	UNICEF	Child Protection Officer
Ecuador	UN Women	Project Analyst
Egypt	UNHCR	Field Associate Officer
Egypt	WFP	Program Officer
Kyrgyzstan	OHCHR	Communication Officer
Zimbabwe	UNDP	Peacebuilding Officer
Sudan	WFP	Program Officer
Senegal	UNHCR	Regional Service Associate Officer
Palestine	UNICEF	Participation of Youth Officer
Bangladesh	UNDP	Peacebuilding Program Officer
Timor-Leste	UNDP	Disaster Risk Management Officer
Philippines	UNRC	Peacebuilding Officer
Vietnam	UN Women	Program Officer
Myanmar	WFP	Logistic Officer
Laos	UNICEF	Child Protection Officer
Rwanda	UNDP	Youth & Governance Officer

their experience in the Primary Course to enter and contribute to various UN offices in the field of peacebuilding. For example, Marie Oniwa, an alumna of the launch year, now serves as the Advisor for Sexual Violence in Conflict for UN Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo, at the P5 rank (section manager level).

According to Table 3, the annual PA “survival rate,” excepting FY 2010, has either reached or exceeded 80%, meaning that more than twelve out of fifteen former PAs remain employed within the field of peacebuilding in any given year. What is more, half of total alumni — 52 out of 104 — are currently active in the UN system.

Challenges

In April 2014, the “Panel of Experts on Peacebuilding” issued a report identifying gaps between what Japan has been and should be doing through the HRDP program.¹³ While recognizing that the HRDP program has contributed to the Japanese government’s policy goal for IPC to a certain extent, the panel called for fundamental reform of the program.

The panel put forth fifteen specific recommendations, divided into four categories: (1) establishing the “Japan Peacebuilding Support Center”; (2) strengthening the programs that play to Japan’s strengths; (3) improving the recruitment of and career development for those Japanese within the field of peacebuilding; and (4) improving

Table 3: Current Position of Japanese Alumni (FY2007-2013)¹²

		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
UN Missions	UNAMA	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	MONUSCO	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Total	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
International Organizations	WHO	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
	ICRC	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2
	IOM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	UNDP	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	4
	UNESCO	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	UNHCR	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	4
	UNHQ	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	UNMAS	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	UNOPS	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
	UNICEF	1	0	2	0	1	0	2	6
	UNU	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	UN Habitat	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	OSCE	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	World Bank	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
	UN Women	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
WFP	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	
Total	2	9	5	4	2	2	6	30	
JPO	0	1	4	3	2	8	4	22	
NGO • NPO	0	1	0	1	1	3	0	6	
Private Sector	2	0	2	1	2	0	1	8	
Government	MOFA HQ	2	2	1	1	0	0	0	6
	Embassies	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2
	Others	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	4
	Total	3	2	3	1	2	0	1	12
JICA	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	4	
University	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	
Others	5	0	1	4	5	0	3	18	
Total	15	15	15	15	15	14	15	104	
Survival Rate (%)	67	100	93	73	67	100	80	83	

the system to facilitate career development in the period following completion of the HRDP program.

The most critical challenge revolves around the issue of longer-term career development. The HRDP program clearly demonstrated that systematic support such as that provided through the Primary Course easily paves the way for prominent young professionals to enter the field of peacebuilding. The challenge, however, is not only to remain relevant in the field, but also to ascend in the UN bureaucratic ranks. For example, PAs sometimes struggle to bridge qualification gaps between entry-level positions and mid-rank positions in the United Nations.

The JPO program can fill some of the gaps between UNV and P2 levels of employment. However, a major obstacle exists for JPOs aspiring to regular UN positions, such as those at the P3 and P4 levels. The panel highlighted the need for bridging this gap and suggested the creation of a new course aimed at mid-level practitioners. Yet one shortcoming of this recommendation is that it offers no direction or guidelines detailing how such a course might be designed to bring about the desired results. In fact, the HRDP program attempted to address this gap through the Civilian Experts Course in 2010, but found it difficult to convince prospective applicants that a two-week course in Japan constituted a worthwhile investment. This is because most of the applicants were already active in the field and thus already had a wide range of training opportunities (offered by the UN and beyond) from which to choose. While attending the HRDP course might have enriched their resumes, it was not perceived as an effective support mechanism that would facilitate the promotion of mid-career applicants to essential staff members within their respective organizations.

Another challenge facing the program is how to systematically help PAs further develop their careers in peacebuilding. If PAs decide to stay within the field, they must consider how their private lives intersect with their career development. Indeed, the nature of the environments in which they work — many PAs are stationed in troubled reaches of the globe — are often not conducive to bringing along family members. This has proven to be one of the most glaring impediments to career development in the field of peacebuilding, for many retreat from the frontlines when they wish to get married, raise children, and/or look after their parents. The review panel identified this challenge as requiring future attention and advised program leaders to promote career flexibility so that peacebuilders might be encouraged to go back and forth between peacebuilding efforts and the fields of reconstruction, development, and humanitarian aid. The panel also recommended that more efforts be made towards the re-education, re-recruitment, and dispatch of women who suspend their careers in order to give birth, raise children, or care for parents.

The HRDP program also faces a critical challenge inherent in its original program design, as the situation surrounding peacebuilding has dramatically changed since the program's inauguration in 2007: the two main focuses of the program — the United Nations and Asia — no longer intersect in IPC. In the past, the

United Nations was given a mandate to organize large peacekeeping/peacebuilding missions in Cambodia and Timor-Leste. It is unlikely that the United Nations will play a similar role in potential hotspots in Asia. HRDP's regional focus has already shifted from Asia to Africa as of 2014. At the same time, the Japanese government must devise policies to better utilize prior investments in human resources within Asia for peacebuilding purposes, empowering Japanese peacebuilders to make a difference alongside their Asian counterparts.

The disappointing reality is that most of the recommendations put forward are not new. In fact, their persistence illustrates the complexity of the challenges Japan has long faced in human resource development for peacebuilding.

Cooperation with the US

In the past, no formal cooperation existed between the United States and Japan in relation to the HRDP program. However, the two governments have collaborated in a different — but similarly motivated — initiative in the Asia Pacific. The Japanese government has co-hosted the Global Peace Operations Initiative Senior Mission Leaders (GPOI-SML), a biannual training program, with the United States since 2009. This two-week training initiative aims to prepare senior mission leaders such as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG), Force Commander, and Police Commissioner for peacekeeping operations, and it could be made to complement the HRDP program, which provides an entry point for young professionals. At present, however, there has been no interaction between these programs.

None of the former participants of the GPOI-SML (about ninety in total) have been appointed to senior mission leader positions in UN missions. Hence, the Japanese government together with the US government should seriously reconsider the effectiveness and relevance of the GPOI-SML and consult closely with the United Nations. At the same time, politics play an important role when it comes to the appointment of senior leadership positions (although in principle, the United Nations seeks to uphold impartiality and avoid illegitimate political interference from member states in its operations, to include its peacekeeping/peacebuilding missions).

In the Asia Pacific, the United States and Japan can collaborate in IPC policies and activities much further. Since the possibility that the United Nations will take the lead in peacekeeping/peacebuilding in the Asia Pacific is quite low, the two governments can explore alternative regional platforms to the United Nations. For example, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) can provide a good foundation for both countries to work together. The two governments should exercise their political clout to formulate a set of regional policies and initiatives through which US-Japan cooperation for peacekeeping/peacebuilding can be pursued in the Asia Pacific.

In the area of IPC, governmental and non-governmental cooperation between the two countries should be encouraged. The Asia Foundation has played a key

role in IPC activities in Timor-Leste, Mindanao (the Philippines), and elsewhere. The Nippon Foundation has worked in Myanmar to address the problem of ethnic minorities, and MOFA has named its Chairman, Yohei Sasakawa, a “special ambassador” charged with improving the welfare of Myanmar’s minorities. Additionally, the Asia Foundation re-established its office in Myanmar in 2013 and formed a strategic partnership with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to explore opportunities for cooperation in the field of peacebuilding. Perhaps both the United States and Japan can initiate a ‘whole-of-society’ approach in Myanmar.

Policy Recommendations

To achieve closer synergy between peacebuilding and development, more systematic coordination between JICA and the GHRDPD program is in order.

The ‘Panel of Experts on Peacebuilding’ urged greater collaboration by the HRDP with the field of development aid, which was reflected in the subsequent restructuring of the GHRDPD program. The new program, to be implemented in FY 2015, will incorporate the development aspects of peacebuilding to answer the challenge of long-term career development for Japanese PAs.

For example, JICA runs the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) program, a bilateral effort in which most of the JOCVs are dispatched to support a host government (including municipalities and other local authorities). In addition to the JPO opportunity, or perhaps after completing the JPO assignment, some Japanese peacebuilders could be sent to fragile states under bilateral agreements that utilize the same platform as JOCV, accommodating young peacebuilders up to the age of thirty-nine. For peacebuilders over forty years old, JICA has another civilian dispatch group, comprised of ‘senior volunteers’ and ‘experts,’ through which peacebuilders can bring family members with them to their overseas duty stations. Institutional collaboration with JICA, or emulation of these JICA schemes, can open new pathways for peacebuilders to develop their careers. Concomitantly, JICA will be able to secure a pool of civilian experts who are competent and willing to work in fragile states.

Japan should take advantage of its past HRDP program investments in Asia to establish a platform on which Japanese peacebuilders may collaborate with other Asian peacebuilders to address potential flash-points in the region.

For the past eight years, the HRDP program has worked very closely with countries in Asia. It has invested in human resources and strengthened networks, all of which will help Japan fulfill its responsibility as a peace enabler in Asia. There are a number

of anticipated challenges likely to emerge in Asia, such as tensions in Myanmar (with ethnic minorities), Thailand (with Muslim inhabitants in the Deep South), and the Philippines (with Muslim inhabitants in Mindanao). It is unlikely that the United Nations will be called in to supervise the peacebuilding process in these countries, and the “Panel of Experts on Peacebuilding” suggested exploring the possibility of multilateral cooperation, including a joint project with countries in the Asia Pacific, to address such regional maladies. It is worth exploring alternative platforms to the United Nations for IPC activities in Asia.

As a peace enabler, Japan should invest in the revitalization of existing regional frameworks, such as ASEAN Plus and ARF, together with the United States.

Moreover, Japan can also form or join ad hoc multinational frameworks as it has done in the Mindanao peace process in the Philippines; Japan was the only country to send representatives to both the International Contact Group and the International Monitoring Team in the Mindanao peace process. While these representatives have so far been government officials such as diplomats and staff members of JICA, in the near future, alumni of the HRDP program should seek to fill these positions.

Another good example can be found in the case of Afghanistan. When the Japanese government assumed responsibility for implementing the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants program, it hired Kenji Isezaki and Rumiko Seya, both DDR experts, as a JICA expert and diplomat, respectively. Both then parachuted to the Japanese Embassy in Kabul to respond to the predicament. If the practice of appointing appropriate HRDP alumni to these positions is institutionalized, career paths for mid-rank peacebuilders will grow more diverse and appealing.

The tender notice for the FY 2015 GHRDPD program clearly states that the purpose of the new program is to overcome paramount existing challenges: “Japan’s civilian contribution to the field of peacebuilding is still limited. As of January 2015, only thirteen Japanese work in UN missions as civilian experts. It is urgent and imperative that this situation is improved.”¹⁴ As examined in this paper, the HRDP program has paved the way to expand Japan’s civilian contribution to IPC. There are myriad unsolved challenges preventing those who might otherwise be interested in and capable of building a career in the field of peacebuilding from doing so. While the results of Japan’s new efforts have yet to materialize, one thing is certain: the Abe administration has continued to emphasize its intention to promote the policy of making a “proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation.” The HRDP program has served as the core policy tool for the Japanese government to realize this policy goal. Hopefully, the program will emerge from its 2015 reorganization as a more robust means for Japan to enhance its participation in the area of peacebuilding.

Endnotes

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New Dimensions for Japan's Contributions to UN Blue Helmets

Michio Suda¹

Policy Objectives

Enhance Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

The goal of strong cooperation with the United Nations and its member states in the effort to maintain international peace and security through UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) is consistent with the “Proactive Contribution to Peace” principle articulated in Japan's National Security Strategy. In particular, more robust Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) participation in UN PKO forces is a tangible way of demonstrating Japan's commitment to UN PKOs.

Support efforts to improve the quality of peacekeeping activities.

The JSDF is one of the world's most advanced militaries, known for its well-trained and high-readiness personnel. Meanwhile, it is becoming increasingly important to ensure that military components of UN PKOs are able to meet capability and performance requirements for mandated multidimensional tasks within their operational environments.² Thus, Japan seeks to help build the capacity of uniformed personnel in foreign countries.

Proactively support rapid PKO troop deployment in Africa.

Japan's support of this effort is exemplified by the UN project for African Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities (ARDEC), with its attempt to further coordinate with the US-launched initiative known as the “African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership” (APRRP). For “tailored peace operations” in the mission start-up or surge phases, the most effective approach often entails sequenced mandates, beginning with a call for immediate UN deployment and the execution of political, security, and protection tasks, followed by a mandate encompassing a full range of multidimensional tasks over the medium- and long-term.³ Proactively supporting rapid PKO troop deployment capacity in Africa would allow Japan to play a greater role in shaping the multi-phased UN PKO missions that are often required to address complex strategic issues.

Context

For more than twenty years since the end of the Cold War, Tokyo has responded to calls from the international community for more tangible Japanese contributions

to the cause of global peace and security by authorizing JSDF participation in various PKO missions. These include the mission for UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), UN Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), UN Disengagement Observer Force in Golan Heights (UNDOF), UN Transition Authority in East Timor (UNTAET, renamed as UN Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISSET) after East Timor's independence in May 2002), UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Each deployment order was based on Japan's 1992 International Peace Cooperation Act (IPCA), which was designed to permit meaningful Japanese contributions, namely deployment of the JSDF, to UN efforts in global peacekeeping.

Although the law allowed Japan to send the JSDF to participate in UN PKOs, it also imposed significant constraints on the types of PKOs in which the JSDF could engage. Specifically, the law set five conditions for JSDF participation:

1. The existence of a cease-fire agreement among parties to the conflict
2. Consent for UN and Japanese deployment from involved parties
3. Impartiality in relevant UN operations
4. Immediate withdrawal of the JSDF in the event that the aforementioned guidelines cease to be satisfied
5. Minimum use of weapons to protect the lives of dispatched personnel

Under such a restrictive legal framework, even for UN cease-fire and PKO missions, the JSDF's use of weapons was very much restricted – troops have been allowed to use weapons only for self-defense or the defense of their weapons and equipment. These five conditions have also prevented Japan from dispatching the JSDF infantry to any recent multidimensional UN PKOs under the Chapter VII mandate, through which UN troops are authorized to use force for purposes other than self-defense at a tactical level when executing key mandates specified by the UN Security Council.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has tried to move beyond past precedents, making an effort to allow greater flexibility for JSDF participation in UN PKOs. Abe first laid out his government's policy goals on the subject at the first summit meeting on UN PKOs on September 26, 2014. In his speech, he described Japan's commitment to PKOs as a means of supporting and extending "the bridges to the bank of peace" in conflict-torn areas.⁴

Prime Minister Abe also attended the Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping on September 28, 2015, mere weeks after publication of the UN Secretary-General Report on the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (hereafter referred to as the "Review Report"). In a speech delivered at the meeting, Abe discussed the peace and security legislation approved by the Diet not long before, declaring that Japan "can and will further expand its contribution to UN PKOs."⁵ He also renewed Japan's commitment of support for both UN PKO capacity-building and efforts to improve the rapid-response capacity of such personnel in Africa and beyond.⁶

Indeed, Japan has made steady progress toward realizing the three policy objectives outlined in Abe's September 2014 speech and described earlier in this

chapter. First came Diet approval in September 2015 of the peace and security legislation (including amendment of the IPCA), which widened the scope of missions the JSDF can execute. The new law also provided the JSDF greater flexibility in the use of weapons while executing missions mandated by the UN Security Council, allowing dispatched JSDF troops to employ weapons beyond the strict definition of self-defense and thereby enabling them to better protect civilians from physical violence. These recent legal developments could help Japan honor its first commitment: participating proactively in UN PKOs.

To further support international efforts to improve the quality of PKOs, the JSDF is expanding cooperation with PKO training centers across the world, dispatching JSDF personnel as instructors to share experiences and lessons learned during time spent overseas. The JSDF has also taken a leading role as chair of the Engineer Unit working group in the UN Military Unit Manuals project, which, as its name suggests, seeks to develop manuals for military units that participate in PKOs. These projects are just a few examples of Japan's commitment to improving the quality of peacekeeping activities.

With regard to building the capacity for rapid PKO deployment in Africa, Japan has coordinated closely with the United States to launch the APRRP project. Japan established the necessary mechanisms to provide military engineering equipment to Africa through the UN Trust Fund with the UN Project for ARDEC. ARDEC also envisions providing various forms of training to PKO personnel from African countries and strengthening the operational posture of newly-emerging or surge-required PKOs by establishing military engineering schools outfitted with two sets of equipment (one for training and one for operational purposes). Japan intends to develop ARDEC into a full-fledged training program beginning in 2016. Furthermore, at the second UN PKO summit meeting in September 2015, Japan pledged to improve the capacity of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) for rapid deployment by assisting with the development of strategic airlift capabilities.⁷ Japan's Africa-focused initiatives, unlike the conventional capacity-building projects common throughout the history of UN PKOs, represent a unique and creative approach to peacekeeping.

Challenges

Balancing between Japan's Short-Term Strategic Priorities and Long-Term Interest in Contributing to UN PKOs.

There has been considerable transformation in the regional security environment surrounding Japan over the past decade, making a robust homeland defense force an urgent priority. This growing need for military responsiveness closer to home has sharply limited Japan's ability to increase its "direct" and "stand-alone" military contributions to UN PKOs. As a result, some of Japan's neighbors in the Asia Pacific are now regarded as more active participants in UN PKOs.

In September 2014, General Kiyofumi Iwata, Chief of Staff of the Ground

Staff Office, presented his assessment of such an increasingly demanding regional security environment and offered a defense strategy for countering this emerging situation:

China is rapidly boosting its military power to cover a greater area, not only repeatedly violating our territorial waters and airspace but also obstructing free air traffic over the high sea...continuing what seems to be an attempt to change the status quo by coercion. ...Based on the above recognition of circumstances, Japan has developed new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG 14) and Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP 15). ...These programs are aiming for the realization of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force... with special emphasis on countermeasures against attacks on islands.⁸

Unfortunately, the growing need for Japan to prioritize homeland defense necessarily entails a tradeoff: expanding the ability to respond to security challenges closer to home will almost certainly come at a cost to JSDF participation in UN PKOs, despite the widened scope of activities and increased operational flexibility authorized in recent months. Simply put, since Japan's defense budget is unlikely to see a considerable increase in the foreseeable future, Tokyo may have to opt out of sending JSDF personnel on intensive overseas deployments under the umbrella of UN PKOs. Instead, to avoid spreading itself too thin while still honoring the Japanese government's commitment to boosting its contribution to UN PKOs, the JSDF may have to pursue something more akin to a "partnership" with the UN and major world powers.

Implications for Expanding the Scope and Authority of the JSDF in UN PKOs:

With passage of the revised peacekeeping-related law mentioned above, the JSDF now has legal authorization to execute broader tasks in UN missions related to mandates including protection of civilians (POC) that may call for use of weapon. This legal evolution could raise expectations for Japan as it relates to execution of POC-related tasks.

Carrying out the POC mandate requires a "robust" approach from UN PKO troops. In a UN policy guideline, robust POC operations involve the following sequence of actions:

1. Assurance and prevention: Including proactive patrols to establish a visible, credible presence for deterrence and intensified public outreach activities to gather information, as well as assure local peoples
2. Pre-emption: Heightened situational awareness, increased high-profile patrolling, and use of intervening forces
3. Response: Including speedy deployment of inter-positional troops and the selective use of direct and lethal force
4. Consolidation: Pursuing post-crisis stabilization by assisting local populations and encouraging host nation authorities to normalize the situation; including

provision of immediate medical care, collection of evidence, notification of appropriate civilian experts, and establishment of defense positions⁹

These UN guidelines for POC have sparked controversy among major TCCs, whose personnel are stationed on the front lines to address physical violence against innocent civilians in host countries, and Western powers, which stress human rights but are unwilling to send frontline troops to PKOs. Furthermore, TCCs have been generally unwilling to take a proactive approach, including a robust use of force for POC tasks. Such factors sometimes hamper operational effectiveness and, more importantly, undermine the credibility of UN PKOs in the eyes of local peoples in host countries.

On the other hand, when national interests are at stake, some TCCs have been more willing to take relatively high risks for POC mandates. For instance, Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso have participated proactively in counter-extremist defensive operations for the POC in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA, the current UN mission in Mali). This is in spite of the significant casualties they have sustained as jihadist terrorist groups work to expand their influence across regions where those TCCs are located.¹⁰

Another example is the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), in which South Africa and Tanzania participated – by joining an offensive military formation to suppress an armed group under the pretext of the POC – because their regional interests were at stake.

Those TCCs that are more willing and capable of executing the POC mandate will continue to take the lead on POC tasks, although the requirements for enhancing their capabilities in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) still exist, according to the statements of the UN Force Commanders.¹¹ This suggests that there may be less pressure on Japan to join the ranks of TCCs executing POC tasks in missions in Africa. When Herve Ladsous, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, spoke during his visit to Japan in January 2015, he indicated that while the UN needs Japan to “bring us high-end capabilities that we need on the ground,” he did not ask Tokyo to send JSDF to the frontlines.¹² Rather, he stressed that he would like to see Japan contribute more via logistical support, technological cooperation, and rapid PKO development.¹³

Meanwhile, Western powers send limited troop levels on those UN PKOs that involve the African continent, choosing instead to throw their weight behind a recently-formalized framework of the Technology Contributing Countries (Tech CCs), created to provide technical support to less-capable African TCCs. Tech CCs are being implemented under an emerging concept of “triangular partnership” among the UN, Tech CCs, and TCCs.¹⁴ Triangular partnership is a policy tool with which the UN could increase the incentives to contribute for low-capability TCCs that have demonstrated a high willingness to carry out POC tasks. For instance, the UN could use Tech CCs to fill capacity shortfalls of less capable but highly-motivated TCCs with required equipment and TTP-related training. Moreover, the UN can now, in closer coordination with Tech CCs and Financial Contributing Countries (FCCs, which are mostly comprised of Western powers) grant TCCs

Table 1: Role of Each Player in UN PKOs and Relationships among Them

	Less-Motivated Major TCCs (To Be Deployed to Lower Risk Areas)	Highly-Motivated Major TCCs (To Be Deployed to Higher Risk Areas)
Capabilities	Low	Low
Willingness to Take Risks	Weak; Low Tolerance of Casualties	Relatively High; More Tolerant of Casualties

The diagram below the table shows two large black arrows pointing upwards. The left arrow is labeled 'DECREASING' and has two horizontal dashed arrows pointing outwards from its base. The right arrow is labeled 'INCREASING' and also has two horizontal dashed arrows pointing outwards from its base.

<p>Tech CCs (Western Powers & Major FCCs including Japan)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergency Strategic Deployment Support including Strategic Airlift, Standing Enablers (ex. the Japan-led ARDEC) • High-end Capability Support including Intelligence, Counter-IED Support by Provision of Equipment & Training
<p>UN Secretariat (DPKO/DFS)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Takes the Lead for Triangular Partnership with Tech CC & TCC • New Premium of Reimbursement for Those TCC Taking Higher Risks

whose interest exceeds their ability a new premium of reimbursement for high-quality performance in situations of risk.¹⁵

As discussed above, multiple players have a role in enhancing the operational effectiveness of POC-oriented UN PKOs. The roles and the relationships among them are depicted in Table 1.

The mounting need to prioritize homeland defense while continuing to demonstrate Japan’s commitment to liberal and democratic values demands prudent, efficient utilization of the JSDF’s advanced capabilities. Japan may do so by consolidating its position as a leading TCC and securing its current status as the world’s second-largest FCC.

Cooperation with the US

The ongoing US-led APRRP project and the provision of rapid engineering deployment support to Africa by Japan represent two distinct enterprises. That said, the two endeavors could be joined in a way that would allow Japan to focus on specific TCCs, identical to the ones with which the US has undertaken bilateral rapid-deployment-related capacity-building, namely Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The Japanese program to develop engineering schools, for example, could prioritize the aforementioned TCCs when disseminating invitations for training assistance, so that US and Japanese efforts would have a multiplier effect. The two countries could build upon each other’s efforts, with

Japan training individual operators and the US providing collective training to engineering units.

Such US-Japan collaboration at a global level would do more than expand the scope of the US-Japan alliance beyond the Asia Pacific. Indeed, this cooperative approach to UN PKOs would honor the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation (updated in April 2015), which establishes an expectation for the two governments to cooperate more closely in the effort to maximize interoperability and provide coordinated logistical support to UN PKOs.

Policy Recommendations

Given the deteriorating East Asian security environment, Tokyo should enhance its participation in UN PKOs both independently and in partnership with other nations, all the while placing greater focus on the “quality” (technical support) rather than “quantity” (number of troops) of its contribution. In particular, Japan should explore the potential for triangular partnerships with the UN and TCCs, as well as with the US and EU, to augment Japanese peacekeeping contributions in a politically and fiscally sustainable manner.

Pursue Triangular Partnership Peacekeeping between Japan, the UN, and TCCs

Japan has already allocated 40 million dollars for the UN project created to rapidly deploy engineering assistance to Africa in the form of engineering equipment for UN PKOs and operational training for lower-end TCCs at UN-managed facilities on the continent. This initiative offers Japan a prime opportunity to consolidate its position as a Tech CC under the framework of triangular partnership with the UN and TCCs. It is likely that General Iwata expressed JSDF’s strong support – on the basis of Prime Minister Abe’s remarks in September 2014 – for a new PKO support framework such as Tech CCs when he attended the first UN-chaired Chiefs of Defense Conference on March 27, 2015 (a gathering that aimed to follow up the September 2014 Leader’s Summit on Peacekeeping). It is likely that he expressed JSDF’s strong support on the basis of the Prime Minister’s preceding remarks in September 2014. There is certainly room for Japan to grow as a Tech CC, given the need for water purification plants, information communications technology, UAVs, and ground movement detection sensors in myriad corners of the developing world.

Meanwhile, there exists a reactionary movement among major TCCs against the emerging concept of Tech CCs. Opponents are eager to water down the significance of Tech CCs, as they fear the growing influence of Tech CC will undermine their dominance of PKO-related policy-making. Such competition makes it even more imperative for Japan to forge “an additional triangular partnership” for peacekeeping, as recommended below with respect to cooperation with the US and EU.

Triangular Partnership Peacekeeping between Japan, the US, and the EU

Japan should explore further cooperation with the EU in addition to the US. First of all, the composition of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) reveals that major European countries have developed and sustained relatively large, advanced military contributions to UN PKOs in the Middle East, a region on whose stability Japanese energy security increasingly depends. More narrowly, increased defense cooperation with EU armed forces deployed in UN PKOs would enable the JSDF to learn from advanced militaries with more on-the-ground experience and, because of existing operational-level cooperation between the EU and UN in “partnership peacekeeping,” improve the effectiveness of Japanese engagement in the complex structure of UN PKOs.¹⁶

The following list identifies potential areas for triangular partnership peacekeeping among Japan, the US, and the EU:

- Informational and situational awareness
- Command and control (e.g., forward deployable headquarters)
- Standby and quick reaction forces
- Logistics and enablers (e.g., helicopters; fixed wing aircraft; engineering; signals; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; and medical and counter-improvised explosive devices (IEDs))
- High-tech equipment
- Trainers and French/Arabic-speaking personnel¹⁷

The US, EU, and Japan all possess armed forces with such advanced capabilities, and “even if they were all only willing to offer limited individual contributions, they could organize these contributions so as to make a significant collective addition to the UN’s capabilities.”¹⁸ In other words, an individual “token troop contribution,” however small, could significantly improve the operational effectiveness of UN PKOs if made in tandem with other nations; the sum is greater than its parts.¹⁹

Deploying to TCCs the JSDF’s high-tech small detachments, including well-trained operators and advanced equipment, in tandem with EU forces and US equipment, is but one theoretical example of a Japan-US-EU triangular partnership in action. Consider contributions already being made by the US and EU:

The US does not currently deploy military units under UN command but has been providing front-line weapons (such as armored vehicles and self-sustainability gear) to address the issue of contingent-owned, TCC-equipment shortfalls among UN PKOs deployed in Africa. Concomitantly, EU members have deployed a multinational intelligence unit to MINUSMA to assist in situational awareness for front-line UN troops who lack intelligence capabilities for defensive counter-extremist operations. The EU unit, named the All Source Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU), is comprised of IMINT, HUMINT, and SIGINT elements, which are in turn supported by the robust reconnaissance capabilities of advanced attack helicopter detachments.²⁰ Individual EU member states have also contributed to the development of counter-IED devices by and training for TCC personnel

on the front lines in Mali. These are areas where Japan, as part of the Tech CC cohort, could partner with the US and the EU, dispatching small, well-trained, and well-equipped elements to fill gaps left by partner countries. Working with a multinational contingent in a fashion similar to that of EU members in Mali is certainly worth Japanese consideration.

Of course, the proposed triangular partnerships could face challenges, including strategic ambiguity and a sense of unequal burden-sharing among involved parties.²¹ For instance, though the UN had decided not to engage in counter-Jihadist operations when MINUSMA was established in 2013, realities on the ground in Mali forced MINUSMA troops into such operations under the premise of “operating in an asymmetric environment.” This elicited competing opinions, most glaringly between the UN Secretariat and conservative, major TCCs. Japan must therefore be cautious before committing to proposed partnerships for PKOs, which may suffer from similar ambiguities. To be sure, the proposed partnership envisions Japan providing limited contributions, a fact that could well rankle other partners and result in the marginalization of Japan. To avoid such an eventuality, Tokyo would have to engage in strategic outreach to articulate how its contributions, though seemingly modest, were critical to the triangular peacekeeping partnership; the Chief of Defense Conference and annual Peacekeeping Summit would provide the best opportunities for Japan to do so.

It should also not be forgotten that “the UN is being pushed into an increasingly sensitive and dangerous role in handling crisis in the Middle East and North Africa.”²² It goes without saying that the danger posed by Islamic-extremists based in these regions is transnational in nature, increasingly confronting UN PKOs with asymmetric threats such as those encountered in Mali. Thus, if the UN “does not receive some serious reinforcements, one or more of its missions will eventually crack under the strain – with unpredictable and potentially dangerous implications for Europe in particular. The United States and Europe cannot ignore this challenge.”²³ While these serious concerns appear to be part of the strategic motivation for Western powers to further embrace a partnership approach in UN PKOs, Japan should not feel a false sense of security – the Asia Pacific is far from insulated against such transnational asymmetric threats. In order to secure the interests of the liberal and democratic international community amid the creeping threat of non-state terrorist activities, Japan should continue to explore policy options for how to best contribute to the operational effectiveness of UN PKOs under the framework of the proposed double triangular partnership for peacekeeping.

Endnotes

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Final Thoughts

Yuki Tatsumi

Japan commemorated the 70th anniversary of the end of World War Two last year. On August 14, 2015, in his statement commemorating this new beginning for Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe spoke of Japan's unshakable commitment to "never again resort to any form of the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes."¹ In 2015, the United Nations celebrated its 70th anniversary as well. Abe, appearing in front of the UN General Assembly on September 29, 2015, reaffirmed his government's commitment to nation-building through "fostering human resources, offering utmost in humanitarian assistance and upholding women's rights."² He also emphasized that Japan's intent to actively participate in the UN's endeavors to tackle global challenges would remain a core pillar of Japan's foreign policy.

The policy briefs in this volume have considered various aspects of Japan's role in UN-led efforts for peace and security. As Toshiya Hoshino surveyed in his overview, the United Nations symbolizes fundamental principles that constitute the post-1945 international order, including non-use of force, non-interference in internal affairs, and peaceful settlement of international disputes. These essays examined how Japan has played a role in a range of efforts under UN auspices to promote and uphold these international norms.

Kazuo Tase introduced Japan's efforts to promote the concept of "human security" as an alternative conceptual framework to better address the challenges faced by vulnerable populations. Kazuto Tsuruga, citing Japan's experience in providing assistance to post-conflict Afghanistan, discussed the potential role Japan could play in assistance for fragile states. Yuji Uesugi discussed Japan's little-known effort to provide education and training to those (both Japanese and non-Japanese) who aspire to work in the field of UN-led peacekeeping. Finally, Michio Suda challenged the criticism that the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) should participate in UN-led peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in larger numbers, suggesting that the JSDF as an advanced military has a unique niche to fill by working with the UN, EU, and other countries that contribute troops to UN PKOs more closely.

Taken together, these papers highlight one strong message: Japan has the capacity to play a much larger role in the UN as a "peace enabler." After all, Japan remains the world's second-largest financial contributor to the UN in fiscal year 2015.³ Although still few in numbers, there is an emerging generation of young professionals who are enthusiastic about pursuing careers in areas related to international peacekeeping. The JSDF, though its participation in PKOs has been restricted to non-combatant missions, has been successful in implementing its responsibilities and has established a solid reputation for its performance.

As Prime Minister Abe alluded to in his September 2015 speech to the UN General Assembly, Japan's contributions have been most effective when working to bridge the gaps between phases of operations or gaps in capacity between the provider and recipient of assistance.⁴ These contributions have not attracted much attention because Japan, with the exception of its financial contribution, is often not among the first wave of countries to offer assistance. However, while Japan's contributions may not be provided immediately, it is enduring, often continuing long after the world's attention has moved on to other crises. For instance, since its launch in 1993, Japan has remained committed to the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), devising a framework by which aid providers (industrial countries and international organizations) and recipients (countries in Africa) can hold a focused discussion on issues relating to development. TICAD particular encourages African countries to take ownership in their own economic development, and the aid providers work with recipients as partners to pursue that shared goal. The chapters in this volume each describe Japan's accomplishments and efforts in their respective areas, pointing to the many positive contributions that Japan has made under UN auspices for peace.

At the same time, these chapters also reveal the limits of Japan's current approach, as well as the challenges Japan will face as it seeks to expand its role.

First and foremost, Japan can no longer expect to continue to hold a certain level of influence in the UN simply due to the size of its financial contribution. Although Japan remains the second-largest financial contributor to the UN's annual budget through fiscal year 2016, China is quickly catching up. For instance, China is expected to surpass Japan in its financial contributions to PKO-related activities, replacing Japan as the second-largest financial contributor to UN PKOs.⁵ As Japanese financial woes continue with little prospect that the economic dynamism of the 1980s and 1990s will return in the foreseeable future, Japan's diminishing financial footprint in the UN seems an inevitability.

If it is going to become increasingly difficult for Japan to maintain its presence through financial contributions, how can Japan play a larger role in the range of UN activities? There are at least two other ways in which Japan can contribute: sending more Japanese to work for and with UN agencies to better represent Japan in UN activities and offering innovative approaches to help the UN and its member states to address challenges facing the international community.

Unfortunately, to date Japan has not been successful in either. As Tsuruga and Uesugi demonstrate, Japan has not been able to develop human resources that are capable and willing to work in UN agencies. Rather than a lack of talent, the inflexible nature of career development in Japan is prohibitive for working professionals to develop a career path through any way other than long-term employment. Even if the JSDF can (and should) play an effective role by working more closely with the UN and other countries contributing troops to UN PKOs, Japan is still very much restricted in the types of mission that it can participate in. Despite last year's changes to the legal framework, allowing a little more latitude

in the scope of activities that the JSDF can join, Japan still lacks the flexibility to respond quickly to changes on the ground and the resulting modifications of UN mandates. That level of flexibility will not be possible until the Japanese Diet and the public allow for revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitutions. If the intensity of the debate leading to the passage of the recent security legislation is any guide, such a change in the near future, if ever, is highly unlikely. Given these circumstances, Japan is unlikely to soon see a surge in the number of Japanese working in UN agencies or participating in UN-led efforts.

In Japan's effort to lead the debate to create a new international norm, Tase's analysis of Japan's experience in proposing the concept of human security provides important lessons learned. Despite the potential for the term "human security" as an alternative frame of reference to capture the challenges facing the world's vulnerable populations, Japan has failed to establish this concept as a widely-accepted international norm. The repercussions of its excessive involvement in management of the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) are particularly telling: by insisting on "staying engaged" in the management of the Fund, it has become a virtual administrator, isolating the UNTFHS from the rest of the international community. Had the international community been invited to help manage the Fund when it was first established, more countries may have become essential stakeholders in the Fund's success.

Moving forward, if Japan seriously desires to become a more robust player in many of the UN-led activities, being "proactive" is more essential than ever. For instance, Japan should consider reconstructing its financial contributions to the United Nations so that it can have maximum impact. Especially if the current level of financial contributions is unsustainable, Japan must devise a way in which its contributions can be most impactful.

Second, it is important that Japan is well represented throughout UN agencies. For instance, the number of Japanese staff in UN agencies is well below what is desirable or proportional to Japan's financial contribution to the UN.⁶ As Tsuruga and Uesugi both explained, it is difficult to develop professionals in Japan. Careers in international organizations such as the United Nations often means frequent job transitions among various offices. Japan's employment pattern is simply not conducive to such a career path. Rather than waiting for the labor market culture to change, the Japanese government should look into establishing partnerships with universities and corporations through which aspiring professionals have the opportunity to work in international organizations, without the fear of losing employment at home.

Finally, as the papers in this volume all touch upon, Japan's contributions in many UN-led efforts have either gone unnoticed or without full credit, because Japan has often been slow in responding to calls by the United Nations for contributions. As Tsuruga and Suda suggested in their respective papers, Japan needs to be a part of the UN policy-making process, as the United Nation seeks to shape international responses to global challenges. By participating in such endeavors from the very beginning, Japan can help direct such efforts, rather than waiting to hear what the UN has decided.

Japan is ideally positioned to take such an initiative this year. Japan will be hosting several global meetings, including TICAD in Kenya and the G-7 Summit in Japan. In addition, Japan will serve as a non-permanent member of UN Security Council through the end of 2017. As this year marks the 60th anniversary of Japan's UN membership, the senior-most levels of Japanese government will highly prioritize Japan's involvement in the UN.

Since returning to office in December 2012, Prime Minister Abe has launched many ideas and initiatives. The last two years have been critical for Japan, as the Abe government put in major changes to the framework of postwar Japan's foreign and security policies. 2016 should now be the year of implementation, executing concrete policies grounded in the guiding principle of "proactive contribution for peace based on international cooperation."

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6. Currently, Japan's representation in the UN and other related international organizations is approximately 30% of what is considered desirable based on Japan's financial and other contributions. See "Kokuren Gaiko: Nihon to Kokuren" (UN Diplomacy: Japan and the United Nations), MOFA, January 7, 2016, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/jp_un/index.html (in Japanese).



About the Experts



Dr. Toshiya Hoshino is the Executive Vice President for Global Engagement of Osaka University. Previously, he was a Vice President and the Dean at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University. From August 2006 to August 2008, he served as a Minister-Counselor in charge of political affairs at the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations. At the UN, he was a principal advisor to the Chair of the UN Peacebuilding Commission when Japan assumed its chairmanship. Other previous positions include: Senior Research Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs; Guest Scholar, Columbia University; Fellow, Stanford University; Visiting Fellow, Princeton University; Visiting Fellow, the United States Institute for Peace; Visiting Fellow, University of Wollongong; Consultant to the United Nations University; and Special Assistant at the Embassy of Japan to the United States. He graduated from Sophia University, Tokyo and completed a Master's at the University of Tokyo and Ph.D. at Osaka University.



Colonel Michio Suda has been in the Japan Ground Self Defense Force for 29 years. His specializations are intelligence and UN peacekeeping operations. He has had a number of multi-national and joint operational assignments. Earlier in his career he was a military planning officer, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UNHQ. He holds a master's degree in international affairs. His latest publication is "The Protection of Civilians by UN Peacekeeping Operations: The Military Strategic Conditions to Enhance Effectiveness" in *The Journal of International Security*. He assumed his current post as Senior Military Liaison Officer, DPKO, in June 2015.



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JAPAN AS A PEACE ENABLER

Views from the Next Generation

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Japan as a Peace Enabler: Views from the Next Generation offers a collection of policy briefs on the evolution of Japan's contribution to international peace, particularly through the United Nations. These policy briefs examine Japan's efforts at peacebuilding at a multilateral level as a part of its proactive contribution to international peace and stability. The authors each describe Japan's unique and important role as a contributor to international peace, as well as means by which Japan can strengthen its partnership with the US and partner nations in the UN in order to more effectively respond to growing challenges. These briefs provide policy recommendations for issues of key importance for both Tokyo and Washington.